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WHY CHINA OPPOSES HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION 
DANIEL C.K. CHOW* 
________________________ 
China and other developing countries oppose the introduction of 
human rights at the workplace into the WTO while some developed 
countries argue that human rights obligations should be explicitly 
included in the WTO as a criterion of fair trade.  While this is often 
framed as a debate about human rights, dignity, freedom, and respect, the 
debate, at least as between the United States and China, is really an 
economic debate masked as a moral or ethical one. 
The economic debate concerns whether the United States can use 
trade remedies within the WTO to neutralize two major rights and 
benefits that China enjoys under the WTO:  the “no-quotas” rule – the 
right to be free from total or partial trade bans on its imports – and the 
right to tariffs bound under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which are at historically low levels.  The ability to enjoy these 
two major benefits is essential to China’s mercantilist strategy, which is 
to pursue economic growth through exports to the United States and 
other foreign markets.  Until China joined the WTO in 2001, it was made 
to endure an annual review of its human rights record as a condition of 
receiving these trade benefits from the United States.  Now that China is a 
WTO member, China has a legal right to these benefits.  The debate over 
whether human rights at the workplace should be included in the WTO is, 
at its essence, a debate over whether now that China has joined the WTO, 
the United States can use human rights violations under WTO law as a 
justification for trade restrictions that neutralize or limit these benefits 
that allow China to aggressively export its products to the United States. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
When the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) applied 
for accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the 
United States supported China’s entry after arguments by 
President Clinton to the U.S. Congress that China’s WTO accession 
would have a profound effect in promoting greater political 
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liberties and recognition of basic human rights in China.1  The basic 
premise behind this argument was that exposure to free trade and 
exchanges with other nations would help develop China’s private 
industries, loosen the control of the massive state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) that dominate the PRC economy and thereby 
erode the power of the Communist Party, China’s paramount 
leader, which controls China’s SOEs.2  Loosening of Party control 
over the economy, according to this argument, would inevitably 
lead to greater economic and political freedoms.3  In the decade 
since China’s accession in 2001, however, while the industrial 
output of SOEs has declined significantly and the role of China’s 
private sector has risen sharply in importance,4 China’s human 
rights policies have not progressed,5 but rather, according to the 
views of many observers, have hardened.6  Moreover, in 2012, 
                                                     
1 See Chinese Politics and the WTO: No Change, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21541461 (noting that Clinton persuaded 
Congress to allow China into the WTO based on arguments that such entry would 
have a profound effect on human rights). 
2 Inside the Communist Party, a small core elite, the Political Bureau of the 
Party or Politburo, which consists of about fourteen to twenty-four members, 
makes all of the important political and legal decisions in China.  The inner circle 
of the Politburo, the Politburo Standing Committee, consisting of four to six 
members, is the true power elite in China.  In Chinese politics, the general rule is 
that the smaller the group, the more powerful and elitist it is.  See DANIEL C.K. 
CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 127 
(2nd ed. 2009) [hereinafter CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA].  The Communist Party 
is in theory subject to the law, see XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, § 6 (1982) (China) 
(“No organization or individual is privileged to be beyond the Constitution or the 
law.”), but in reality, the Party is China’s de facto ruler, controlling all of the organs 
of government power by placing Party cadres in key positions, and in doing so, 
acting above the law.  See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA at 119, 132-34 (explaining 
how a small group of elite members of the Communist Party uses its political 
clout to fill government positions). 
3 See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 2, at 132. 
4 See id. at 24-25 (showing a significant drop in output from SOEs following 
the implementation of economic reforms in China, which reflects the growing role 
of private enterprises in Chinese economy).  
5 See Chinese Politics and the WTO, supra note 1 (noting that a decade after 
China’s admission into the WTO, “China’s disappointed liberals no longer 
suggest that freer trade will speed political reform”). 
6 See World Report 2012: China, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Jan. 2012, 
http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-china (stating that, 
despite the growing legal awareness among citizens, the Chinese government's 
overt hostility towards genuine judicial independence undercuts legal reform); 
Annual Report: China 2013, AMNESTY INT’L (May 23, 2013), 
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China’s leadership faced a once in a decade transition.7  The 
Communist Party seemed intent on demonstrating that it was still 
in firm control over the country and tightened its grip over any 
opposition.8  By most accounts, WTO membership has not had the 
intended effect of promoting human rights in China.9 
The failure of China to make meaningful progress in human 
rights through its participation in the global trading system has 
prompted some to call for the inclusion of explicit and affirmative 
human rights obligations that would be binding on all WTO 
members and the World Trade Organization itself.10  The present 
official position of the WTO is that it is a forum for trade 
negotiations and liberalization and is not a proper forum for 
                                                     
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-china-2013 
(articulating how Chinese authorities maintained a stranglehold on political 
activists, human rights defenders, and online activists).  
7 See Jeremy Page, China Party Meets to Anoint Next Leaders, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
8, 2012, 10:54 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732407350457 
8104570581719786.html (describing the prelude to China’s decennial transition of 
power in 2012).  
8 See Brian Spegele & Paul Mozur, China Tightens Grip Ahead Before Meeting: 
Ahead of Party Congress, Crackdown Targets Taxi Windows, Efforts to Scale ‘Great 
Firewall,’ Knives in Stores and on Trains, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2012, 5:52 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204707104578092461228569642.h
tml (depicting the Communist Party’s efforts to marshal its vast security 
apparatus ahead of a once-a-decade shuffle of its leaders). 
9 See China, The WTO, and Human Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l 
Operation & Hum. Rts. Of the H.R. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 106th Cong. 32 (1999) 
(statement of Stephen Rickard, Director Of Amnesty International USA, 
Legislative Office, Washington, D.C.) (providing examples of how trade 
agreements have not had the intended effect on China’s human rights progress). 
10 See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich-Petersmann, Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ 
for Integrating Human Rights Law into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons 
from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 621 (2002) (advocating for a 
complementary “Global Compact” between the U.N. and worldwide 
organizations, such as the WTO, as to integrate universal human rights into the 
law and practice of intergovernmental organizations); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 
The WTO Constitution and Human Rights, 3 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 19 (2000) (stating 
that the non-economic values of WTO law are no less important than the 
economic welfare effects of liberal trade and that the WTO should become an 
advocate of human freedom more generally).  For an extended discussion of 
human rights in international trade, see generally HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2005) and 5 THE WORLD TRADE 
FORUM: INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS - FOUNDATIONS AND 
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES (Frederick M. Abbott et al. eds., 2006). 
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recognizing or promoting human rights.11  This position means the 
WTO and its agreements create no explicit human rights 
obligations with respect to trade and that it may not be possible to 
raise the impact on human rights directly as relevant 
considerations in WTO trade disputes.12  The present position of 
the WTO, of course, does not mean that WTO members could not 
change this position to include human rights in the purview of the 
WTO if enough political support existed among WTO members for 
such a change.13 
The issue of whether to explicitly include human rights into the 
WTO is, not surprisingly, a highly charged and controversial issue.  
On the one hand, proponents of this position call for the WTO to 
                                                     
11 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 26 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter CHOW & 
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW].  It is ironic that human rights in the 
form of rights protecting employees in the workplace played a prominent role in 
the Havana Charter, which was signed in 1948 to create the International Trade 
Organization (ITO), as one of the Bretton Woods institutions that along with the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund would form the fundamental 
institutions of international economic law after the Second World War.  Id. at 18.  
Chapter II of the Havana Charter is entitled “Employment and Economic 
Activity.”  Article 7 of Chapter II addresses fair labor standards as follows: 
The Members recognize that measures relating to employment must take 
fully into account the rights of workers under inter-governmental 
declarations, conventions and agreements.  They recognize that all 
countries have a common interest in the achievement and maintenance 
of fair labour standards related to productivity, and thus in the 
improvement of wages and working conditions as productivity may 
permit.  The Members recognize that unfair labour conditions, 
particularly in production for export, create difficulties in international 
trade, and, accordingly, each Member shall take whatever action may be 
appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory. 
U.N. Havana Charter art. 7, para. 1.  If the ITO had been created then fair labor 
standards would have become an obligation of the multilateral trading system 
and a violation of these standards would have been a justification for a trade 
restriction.  However, the ITO failed to win approval due mainly to opposition by 
the U.S. Congress, and the Havana Charter never came into legal effect.  See CHOW 
& SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 18.  After the failure 
of the Havana Charter, many other attempts were made to introduce human 
rights into the WTO, but none succeeded.  Id. at 369. 
12 For the implications of this position, see infra Part 6 (suggesting that the 
present position appears to be a significant victory for China, as it is now 
protected against the use of human rights at the workplace and labor conditions 
as a justification for the imposition of trade sanctions within the WTO by member 
countries, such as the United States). 
13 There would likely be strong opposition to such a change.  See infra Part 6. 
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adopt an explicit Declaration on Human Rights and its link to 
international trade.14  On the other hand, opponents argue that 
including human rights norms in the WTO would be a serious 
mistake.15   Inserting human rights into the WTO would inevitably 
result in the imposition of the Western norms of developed 
countries, such as the United States and certain countries of 
Europe, on developing countries, such as China, which are at a 
different level of economic development and have vastly different 
ethical norms and expectations.16  Some countries view the 
imposition of such norms as an invasion of their sovereignty.17  
Opponents also argue the WTO would collapse under the weight 
of having to solve all of the world’s problems.18  If human rights 
are explicitly linked with trade and brought into the purview of the 
WTO, then many other social issues may also become linked with 
trade and will overwhelm the WTO.  The great majority of WTO 
members, including China, strongly oppose including human 
rights in the WTO.19 
Although the debate is often framed as one of conflicting 
values and of institutional resources and competence, this Article 
argues that debate concerning human rights in the trade 
relationship between the United States and China is, in reality, a 
debate over a narrow economic and legal issue masked as a 
                                                     
14 A draft declaration on human rights is contained in the Sixth Report of the 
International Trade Law Committee of the International Law Association, Report 
of the 70th ILA Conference.  INT’L LAW ASS’N, BERLIN CONFERENCE REPORT (2004), 
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/24. 
15 See, e.g., Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights 
by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 815 (2002) (rejecting the 
proposal to enforce human rights through the WTO since human rights law has a 
significantly different ideological underpinning than international trade law). 
16 Floris van Hees, Master’s Thesis, Protection v. Protectionism: The Use of 
Human Rights Arguments in the Debate for and Against the Liberalization of Trade, ABO 
2004, at 22-23 (stating that considering human rights during trade negotiations can 
be seen to distort the pursuit of equal rules for all). 
17 Gudrun Monika Zagel, WTO & Human Rights: Examining Linkages and 
Suggesting Convergence, IDLO VOICES OF DEV. JURIST PAPER SERIES, no. 2, 2005, at 16-
17 (explaining that the obligation to consider the promotion of human rights 
when acting in international organizations does not authorize the extraterritorial 
enforcement of national laws, as such enforcement would violate the national 
sovereignty of other states). 
18 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 
369. 
19 See id. 
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general debate over moral, ethical, and institutional issues.  What 
may have once been a genuine debate over the use of trade aimed 
to encourage the expansion of human rights and political freedoms 
in China has now been transformed into a debate over the use of 
human rights by the United States to justify the imposition of trade 
restrictions on imports from China and possibly other low cost 
manufacturing nations, such as Vietnam.20  As we shall see further 
below, in the years from the late 1980s to 2001 during which China 
was negotiating the conditions of its entry into the WTO with the 
United States and other WTO members, the United States viewed 
the use of trade benefits as a catalyst to promote human rights and 
political reform in China.21  Today, the debate over the use of 
human rights in the WTO concerns whether human rights can be 
used to justify trade restrictions.22  In other words, human rights 
have gone from being a ‘carrot’ linked to trade benefits to a 
potential ‘stick’ in the growing number of trade disputes between 
the United States and China.  At its most basic level, the issue of 
the use of human rights in the WTO can be narrowed to a single, 
technical legal issue:  can the United States use human rights to 
impose trade restrictions that offset or neutralize China’s 
comparative advantages in low manufacturing costs that give 
Chinese goods imported into the United States a competitive price 
advantage over similar U.S. goods.23  The most vociferous 
proponents of this issue, U.S. manufacturing industries, while 
raising this as a human rights workers’ issue at the workplace, do 
not really care about the rights of workers in China.24  Instead, U.S. 
                                                     
20 See infra Part 5. 
21 See THOMAS LUM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34729, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA 
AND U.S. POLICY 30 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ 
RL34729.pdf (asserting that progress in human rights represents a test of the 
success of U.S. engagement with China). 
22 See infra Part 6. 
23 See infra Part 6. 
24 The proliferation of ‘codes of conduct’ adopted by U.S. companies and 
these codes’ relative toothlessness illustrates this point.  According to the World 
Bank: 
[T]here are an estimated 1000 codes in place globally . . . . The plethora of 
codes reflects the multitude of actors involved in this movement, each of 
whom have distinct – and often competing – values and priorities.  The 
specific working conditions of individual industries also plays an 
important role in the issues highlighted by codes. 
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manufacturing industries wish to find a way to neutralize the 
substantial cost advantages enjoyed by China’s manufacturing 
industries that can be attributed at least in part to low standards of 
worker safety and rights.25  The issue is a narrow, technical issue, 
but has significant real world implications for U.S.-China trade.  
Allowing the use of human rights at the workplace (and possibly 
beyond) to justify a trade restriction would open a powerful new 
front to the ongoing trade battles between the United States and 
China.  If human rights at the workplace are recognized as a 
criterion of fair trade, the United States may impose trade 
restrictions in the form of quotas (i.e. quantitative restrictions)26 
and countervailing duties (i.e. additional tariffs)27 on imports from 
China.  Stripped of all of its rhetoric about moral and institutional 
issues, this one issue, the availability of the use of quotas and 
countervailing duties against imports from China to offset China’s 
                                                     
Codes of Conduct, WORLD BANK,  http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search 
?q=cache:S98sRejnwS4J:web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXT
SOCIALPROTECTION/EXTLM/0,,contentMDK:20312955~isCURL:Y~menuPK:1
245933~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:390615,00.html+&cd=1&hl=en&c
t=clnk&gl=us (last visited Sep. 29, 2013).  See also Robert J. Rosoff, Beyond Codes of 
Conduct: Addressing Labor Rights Problems in China, CHINA BUS. REV. (Mar. 1, 2004), 
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/beyond-codes-of-conduct/(describing 
the means by which Western businesses are addressing labor rights violation in 
Chinese factories).  Historically, codes of conduct have been adopted to appease 
consumers, but enforcement of the codes is not always a priority.  “[M]any codes 
use vague language, and for certain rights, codes often do little more than ask for 
compliance with the supplier countries’ domestic laws.  Most notably, codes of 
conduct often lack clear language on the freedom of association and wages, and 
frequently defer to domestic law.” Andrew Herman, Note, Reassessing the Role of 
Supplier Codes of Conduct: Closing the Gap Between Aspirations and Reality, 52 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 445, 450–451 (2012) (footnote omitted). 
25 To the extent the low cost of Chinese goods is the result of poor standards 
of worker safety and rights, codes of conduct may attempt to compel an increase 
in the cost of goods concurrent with an improvement of worker rights and 
working conditions.  American consumers, for their part, seem willing to accept 
moderately higher prices as the codes of conduct originated in response to 
American consumer demand generated through exposé campaigns concerning 
worker conditions.  Herman, supra note 24, at 450 (explaining that codes of 
conduct may be voluntary in a legal sense, but exposé campaigns, at least initially, 
led to their adoption by Western companies).  
26 See infra Part 5.1 (discussing quotas and their treatment under the WTO).   
Quotas are generally prohibited under the WTO unless a trade justification can be 
established.  Id. 
27 See infra Part 5.2 (discussing countervailing duties).  Countervailing duties 
cannot be lawfully imposed under WTO law unless certain conditions indicating 
unfair trade practices are present.  Id. 
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low labor costs, is the most important consequence of the debate 
between the United States and China over human rights in the 
WTO.28 
This article examines the debate over the inclusion of human 
rights in the WTO and will argue that the debate is in fact an 
economic debate, and not a moral, ethical, or institutional 
competence debate as so many have commonly framed the issue.  
Part 2 of this Article discusses the history of the controversy over 
human rights between the United States and China and how 
during this phase trade benefits were used as a ‘carrot,’ but created 
lingering resentments on the part of China.  Part 3 discusses how 
the debate about human rights changed as soon as China gained 
entry into the WTO and was guaranteed certain trading rights and 
privileges under the WTO.  Part 4 explains how including human 
rights at the workplace within the WTO will allow the United 
States to neutralize and offset the advantages obtained by China 
through accession to the WTO.  Part 5 examines the validity of the 
arguments that human rights at the workplace can be used to 
justify trade restrictions under current WTO law.  Part 6 examines 
the viability of measures that could be used by the United States in 
response to the violation of human rights in the workplace by 
China.  Finally, Part 7 draws some conclusions on how a debate 
over moral and political rights became transformed into a debate 
over the availability of trade sanctions against China. 
2. HISTORY OF CHINA’S PRE-WTO ACCESSION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
In 1946, in the aftermath of the Second World War, a small 
group of nations, led by the United States, met in Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire and began to put into place the multilateral 
institutions that would serve as the foundation for the modern 
multilateral trading system.29  To jumpstart the post-war 
international trade in goods, several countries formed the General 
                                                     
28 See infra Part 5 (examining the validity of the arguments that human rights 
at the workplace can be used to justify trade restrictions under current WTO law).  
29 See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, & ALAN O. SYKES, JR., LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON 
THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 200 (4th ed. 2002) (describing how the objectives of the Bretton Wood 
Conference were carried out with the emergence of institutions such as the World 
Bank, IMF, GATT, and its successor—the WTO).  
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),30 a multilateral 
agreement designed to reduce tariffs among its contracting 
parties.31  Draconian tariffs, i.e. taxes imposed on imports at the 
border that must be paid before the goods can enter the internal 
market, had created high protectionist barriers during the 1930s 
that led to economic tensions and mistrust among nations.32  For 
example, the United States passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 
1930, which imposed tariffs on imports that averaged fifty-three 
percent of the value of the import.33  Other nations erected 
similarly high tariff barriers in response..34  The intended effect of 
these actions was to prevent trade, as nations viewed each other 
with a mutual lack of trust.35  This mistrust was one of the 
contributing factors that led to the Second World War.36  A lesson 
learned from this era of disastrous economic and political policies 
is that when economic tensions exist, military conflicts will soon 
follow.37  The GATT —and its sister Bretton Woods institutions the 
World Bank, a lending institution to help rebuild Europe;38 the 
International Monetary Fund, an organization to help facilitate 
                                                     
30 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
31 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 26 
(explaining that the GATT’s overarching purpose was to “liberalize trade in goods 
among members by instituting non-discriminatory tariff-treatment among 
members, prohibiting most import quotas, and requiring national treatment of 
imported products once they had cleared customs at the border”)).  
32 Id. at 18. 
33 Id.  See also Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 
590 (1930) (providing an example of high tariffs on imports). 
34 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW supra note 11, at 18. 
35 See U.S. Trade Policy Since 1934 in THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SIGNIFICANT 
U.S. IMPORT RESTRAINTS, Inv. No. 332-325, USITC Pub. 4094 (Aug. 2009), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/research_and_analysis/documents/US_trade_policy_sinc
e1934_(IR6%20pub4094).pdf (providing an overview of U.S. trade policy since 
1934 and summarizing the literature on the economic effects of these policy 
changes on the United States). 
36 See id. at 67 (“‘[B]eggar-thy-neighbor’ policies that followed World War I . . 
. were thought to have led to the economic inequities and resulting resentments 
that contributed to the start of World War II.”). 
37 See id. 
38 Today, the work of the World Bank focuses primarily on alleviating 
poverty by making concessionary loans (i.e. loans with favorable terms) or 
outright grants to developing countries.  CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 19. 
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money flows and exchangeability of currency;39 and the 
International Trade Organization, designed to ease trade barriers 
like tariffs,40 — were designed to “avoid the disastrous economic 
policies” that led to the war.41  Free trade through lower tariffs 
would enhance cooperation among nations and reduce tensions, 
foster cooperation, and avoid conflict and mistrust.42  Although the 
World Bank and the IMF won quick approval, the ITO never 
gained approval due to opposition by the United States.43  The ITO 
was intended to administer the GATT and, as a result of the ITO’s 
demise, the GATT became a self-administering treaty for nearly 
fifty years with a skeletal staff in Geneva.44 
2.1.  China and the GATT 1947 
In 1947, China was one of the original twenty-three signatories 
of the GATT, but China soon withdrew from the GATT in 1950.45  
                                                     
39 The IMF facilitates money flows by discouraging currency devaluations 
and by encouraging the free convertibility of currencies.  If Country A holds a 
large quantity of Country B’s currency due to trade and Country B devalues its 
currency by fifty percent, Country A’s holdings have just lost half their value.  The 
IMF discourages this type of devaluation, which occurred with frequency and 
particular viciousness during the period in the 1930s that led up to the Second 
World War.  Id. at 19-20.  The IMF works closely with the World Bank and the 
WTO.  See id. at 18–21 (explaining that the IMF, World Bank, and WTO are 
“affiliate[] institutions”). 
40 See id. at 18 (“The ITO was to reduce trade barriers and to provide rules for 
international trade.”). 
41 Id.  
42 See id. at 36–37 (citing the “long-standing [philosophical] idea that trade 
promotes peace among nations”). 
43 In 1994, the WTO came into existence assuming, in many ways, the role 
originally intended for the ITO.  Id. at 28. 
44 See Gabrielle Marceau, General Presentation of the WTO Agreement, U.N. 
TREATY COLLECTION, 2005, at 1, available at http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/ 
Marceau_RelDoc4.pdf (illustrating the impact of the lack of the ITO on the GATT). 
45 See Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO Successfully Concludes 
Negotiations on China’s Entry (Sep. 17, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm (providing background information on 
China’s entry into the GATT and WTO).  China was undergoing a civil war 
during this period.  Under the Nationalist (Guomingdang) Government, led by 
Chiang Kai-shek, China was a founding member of the GATT; however, the 
Communist Government, led by Mao Zedong, assumed power in 1949 
vanquishing the Guomindang, which then fled to the island of Taiwan, where it 
claims to this day that it is the government of the Republic of China.  See CHOW, 
LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 2, at 12-13.  On May 5, 1950, the Guomingdang 
withdrew from the GATT.  See Protocol Modifying part II and article XXVI of the 
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In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and 
beginning in 1946, China was plunged into an all-out civil war 
between a Nationalist government backed by the United States and 
a Communist insurgence led by Mao Zedong.46  After Mao 
vanquished the Nationalists and declared the founding of the PRC, 
China withdrew from the GATT.47  For the first few decades after 
its founding, China did not have any significant trade with other 
nations (with the exception of the Soviet Union).48  China chose 
instead to rely on a policy of self-reliance, asceticism, and self-
sacrifice.49  National purification and the continuing pursuit of 
revolutionary ideals, not economic development, were the 
priorities of the nation.50  This period in China’s history was also 
marked by intermittent spasms of immense social upheaval and 
turmoil as Mao, China’s paramount leader, used periodic political 
terror campaigns to root out and destroy his enemies and to 
                                                     
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, at 24 n.1, Mar. 24, 1948, 55 U.N.T.S. 196, 
available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2062/v62. 
pdf (“China . . . by virtue of signature on 21 April 1948 of the Protocol of 
Provisional Application, notified the [U.N] Secretary-General . . . on 6 March 1950 
of the withdrawal of such application. . . . [T]his notice of withdrawal became 
effective on 5 May 1950.”); CRAIG VANGRASSTEK, WORLD TRADE ORG., THE HISTORY 
AND FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 141 (2013), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/historywto_e.pdf (“China was 
among the original contracting parties to GATT. The entry of this agreement into 
force coincided with the final stages of the Chinese Revolution, however, and the 
deposed Kuomintang government declared China’s withdrawal from GATT after 
it took refuge on the island of Taiwan.”).  China requested and was granted 
observer status in the GATT in 1982.  KONG QINGJIANG, CHINA AND THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 5 (2002).  China then attempted to 
resume active status in the GATT on the grounds that the Guomingdang’s 
withdrawal was null and void, id., but this issue became moot when China 
decided to join the WTO.  Negotiations for China’s entry into the WTO began in 
1987 and China became a member in 2001. 
46 See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 2, at 12–13 (discussing the 
historical context of China’s civil war). 
47 See WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on China’s Entry, supra note 
45 (explaining the background behind China’s withdrawal from the GATT). 
48 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & ANNA M. HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA: 
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 15 (2012) [hereinafter CHOW & HAN, DOING 
BUSINESS IN CHINA] (describing the state of China’s foreign trade during the period 
from 1949 to 1978). 
49 See id. 
50 See generally id. at 15–17 (explaining the pursuit of revolutionary ideals 
through the Cultural Revolution).  
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consolidate his power.51  But these chaotic policies also had 
disastrous effects on China’s economy, which hardly progressed at 
all after the founding of the new nation.52  After Mao’s death in 
1976, China’s Party elders were shocked and embarrassed by 
China’s extreme poverty in comparison to its Asian neighbors, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, all of which were far ahead 
in economic development.53  After a period of political in-fighting, 
China’s new paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, declared that the 
focus of the nation would shift from the pursuit of revolutionary 
ideals to economic development.54  China began its watershed 
open door policy of trading with other nations that has led, in the 
span of just three decades, to one of the world’s most vibrant and 
powerful economies.55  
 After economic reforms were adopted in 1978, China soon 
began to experience rapid and continuing growth in its exports.56  
China purposefully pursued a “mercantilist” strategy, a web of 
policies designed to spur exports, which would earn revenues, a 
catalyst of domestic economic growth.57  After adopting its open 
door policies, China soon realized that its lack of membership in 
the GATT stood as a barrier to the pursuit of its mercantilist goals 
because GATT promised significant benefits for the trade in goods 
for its contracting parties.58  All contracting parties to the GATT 
had agreed to tariff schedules with rates that were very low by 
comparison to the historically high pre-GATT rates, but only 
                                                     
51 See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 2, at 15–19 (illustrating the 
turmoil China experienced under Mao’s leadership, including the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution). 
52 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 48, at 16–17 
(outlining a series of disastrous political movements between 1949 and 1978 
which caused significant setbacks to China).  
53 CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 2, at 27.  
54 See id. at 27–36 (explaining the processes and results of the reforms China 
went through in efforts to rebuild its economy). 
55 Id. 
56 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 48, at 28 
(illustrating rapid GDP growth from 1985 to 2008). 
57 See, e.g., Heide B. Malhotra, China’s Mercantilist Strategy Creates Imbalances, 
THE EPOCH TIMES (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/business/ 
china-mercantilist-strategy-31133.html (criticizing the harmful effects of China’s 
strategy on the United States). 
58 See infra Part 3.2 (stating that the promised benefits of GATT include the 
“no quotas” rule and the right to GATT bound tariffs). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
CHOW_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  2:51 PM 
74 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:1 
GATT parties were entitled to these rates as a matter of right.59  For 
example, the United States calculates tariffs on imports based upon 
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) and 
predecessor versions.60  The HTSUS has two columns.  Column 1 
contains the GATT rates and special free trade agreement rates,61 
while Column 2 contains the pre-GATT rates of the 1930 Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act with prohibitively high rates averaging fifty-
three percent of the value of the import.62  Under the Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) principle contained in GATT Article I, all GATT 
                                                     
59 See GATT, supra note 30, at art. II: 1(a)-(b) (providing that a WTO member 
cannot impose a tariff on imports higher than that set forth in its GATT schedule.  
This obligation extends, however, only to imports from other WTO members.  
Non-WTO members have no legal right to the GATT tariff rates). 
60 HTSUS is based upon the Harmonized Tariff System (HTS) developed by 
the World Customs Organization (WCO) located in Brussels, Belgium.  The WCO 
works closely with the WTO to develop agreed upon customs classifications.  The 
WCO developed the HTS and most WTO members have agreed voluntarily to 
adopt the HTS into their domestic law.  The HTS classifies goods into twenty-two 
categories called Sections, which are further split into chapters.  Under the HTS, 
each tariff classification is given a six digit number.  The first two digits identify 
the chapter; the first four digits identify the chapter and heading within the 
chapter; and the first six digits identify the chapter, the heading, and the 
subheading for the good.  Most countries impose tariffs at the eight digit level, 
meaning that all countries adopting the HTS have agreed to have uniformity in 
tariff classifications up to the six digit level for all products, and variations for 
each nation occur at the eight digit level where the tariff is imposed.  The amount 
of the tariff also varies depending upon each nation’s GATT tariff schedules, 
which were individually negotiated with all WTO members.  Each country adopts 
the HTS with variations into its own domestic law.  For example, the United 
States has adopted the HTS, with variations unique to the United States, as the 
HTSUS.  CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 188 
(explaining logistics of the HTS and the HTSUS).  See Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
of the United States 2013, USITC Pub. 4368 (2013), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/1300htsa.pdf 
(presenting the Harmonized Tariff Schedule). 
61 The special rates are those for free trade areas that are even lower than 
GATT rates.  GATT Article XXIV allows WTO members to create free trade areas 
and customs unions that have preferential tariff rates lower than general GATT 
rates.  See GATT, supra note 30, at art. XXIV.  For example, the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico have created a free trade area, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), under which the tariffs for most goods are zero.  See 
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 
605 (1993) (providing an example of a free trading block). 
62 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 146-47 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter 
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS] (providing a 
representative sample of the differences between the GATT rates in Column 1 and 
the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act rates in Column 2). 
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contracting parties were entitled to the Column 1 GATT rates 
while non-GATT parties were subject to the Column 2 rates, unless 
the country in question had separately concluded a bilateral treaty 
with the United States or the United States had otherwise agreed to 
extend MFN treatment to that country.63  In this sense, the MFN 
principle is a misnomer since it does not signify privileged 
treatment.64  Rather, MFN means equal treatment for all GATT 
parties (i.e. all GATT parties receive GATT tariff rates) and is the 
norm, not an exception.65  The United States now eschews the use 
of the MFN term and prefers instead to use the term “Normal 
Trade Relations” (NTR) when referring to countries that receive 
MFN GATT rates.66  An overwhelming majority of the United 
States’ trading partners receive the GATT tariff rates, while only a 
few pariah nations are subject to the Column 2 rates.67  The most 
important consequence of MFN in this context was that GATT 
parties, entitled to MFN treatment as a matter of right, received the 
much lower GATT tariff rates from the United States.68  However, 
non-GATT parties, such as China, which are not otherwise entitled 
to MFN treatment through a separate treaty, did not receive the 
GATT tariffs for its imports into the United States.69  This posed a 
potentially significant trade barrier for China.  
                                                     
63 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 188 
(commenting on the tariff rates applied to goods from WTO members, non-WTO 
members, and “countries that enjoy preferences”). 
64 See id. at 129 (remarking how the MFN principle “is sometimes taken as a 
principle of favoritism, but rather it is a principle of non-discrimination”).  
65 See Jialin Zhang, U.S.–China Trade Issues After the WTO and the PNTR Deal: 
A Chinese Perspective, HOOVER ESSAY IN PUBLIC POLICY, no. 103, 2000, at 1, 20, 
available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/epp_103b. 
pdf (describing the MFN not so much as a special treatment, but as “a global 
standard for normal trade” which entails reciprocal obligations).   
66 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra 
note 62, at 145; see also Zhang, supra note 65, at 1 (using the term “normal trade 
relations” instead of the MFN term to describe the U.S.’s relations with China). 
67 See generally CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 
11, at 189-93 (noting that a great majority of the United States’ trading partners 
enjoy Column 1 rates, and since 2000 the United States has pursued free trade 
agreements all over the world).   
68 See id. at 129 (“MFN in the context of the WTO requires that a WTO 
member must give equal treatment concerning trade advantages to all other 
members . . . .”). 
69 Id. 
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2.2. China and the Period Leading up to its WTO Accession 
By the 1980s, with the start of the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations among all GATT parties—the most ambitious and 
lengthy negotiations in history70—it soon became clear that a new, 
larger, and more ambitious multi-lateral organization, the World 
Trade Organization, would be approved.71  The WTO would not 
only incorporate and administer the GATT (reissued as GATT 
1994), but also would include agreements on services (the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)) and intellectual property 
(the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS)).72  Furthermore, the WTO would administer a dispute 
settlement system under the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU).73  China immediately recognized that it could never become 
a significant international trading nation without joining the 
WTO.74  In 1987, after many years of informal talks, China officially 
began to negotiate with the United States and with other WTO 
members regarding its accession to the WTO.75  The negotiation 
process would take almost fifteen years to complete as the United 
                                                     
70  See Understanding the WTO: The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2013) (describing the complicated nature of the Uruguay Round). 
71 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 18 
(asserting that due to opposition from the U.S. Congress, the International Trade 
Organization, one of the proposed Bretton Woods institutions, was never 
approved.  In many ways, the World Trade Organization assumes the role that 
was contemplated for the ITO).  
72 See id. at 28. 
73  See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex II, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (establishing a refined dispute 
settlement system). 
74 See Tony Saich, China as a Member of the WTO: Some Political and Social 
Questions, Harvard Asia Pacific Review, Jan. 2002, at 1, 3-6, available at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/asaich/China%20and%20the%20WTO.pdf 
(enumerating five principle factors why China desired to join the WTO, including 
its aspirations to be a major international player, desire to offer input on decisions 
affecting its interests, and economic benefits).  
75 See Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Successfully Concludes 
Negotiations on China’s Entry (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm (indicating that negotiations for accession 
began in 1987). 
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States and other parties placed many demands on China as 
conditions of accession to the WTO.76 
Before China finally acceded to the WTO in 2001, China’s 
imports were not entitled to the United States’ GATT rates as a 
matter of right.77  Rather, the United States agreed to extend the 
GATT rates to China based upon an annual approval of MFN 
status by the U.S. President.78  This approval was conditioned on 
an annual review of China’s human rights record.79  The United 
States had a statutory basis in place for this conditional grant of 
MFN status to China.80  In 1971, the United States had passed the 
Jackson-Vanik amendment as part of the 1974 Trade Act in order to 
pressure the Soviet Union to allow Soviet Jews to emigrate to the 
United States or Israel.81  The Jackson-Vanik amendment granted 
MFN treatment to the Soviet Union conditioned upon either an 
annual certification issued by the U.S. President attesting to the 
Soviet Union’s compliance with the amendment or a Presidential 
waiver excusing the application of the statute due to such factors 
as progress in human rights.82  Although the Jackson-Vanik 
                                                     
76 The negotiations culminated in China’s Protocol of Accession, which set 
forth the conditions (and internal changes) for China’s accession to the WTO.  See 
generally, World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 10 November 2001, 
WT/L/432 (2001) [hereinafter Accession of the People’s Republic of China] 
(outlining China’s assumed obligations and rights upon entering the WTO). 
77 See L. Jay Kuo, Farewell to Jackson-Vanik: The Case for Unconditional MFN 
Status for the People’s Republic of China, 1 ASIAN L.J. 85, 108 (1994) (tracing the 
beginning of extensions of MFN status to China from 1979 when President Carter 
issued the first executive waiver with respect to China’s compliance with the 
Jackson-Vanik amendment, prompted by a bilateral trade agreement between 
China and the U.S. signed earlier in the year). 
78 Id. 
79 See id. at 110 (exploring the human rights motivational factor behind the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which technically requires the President to report to 
Congress annually only with respect to China’s emigration record). 
80 See generally Freedom of Emigration in East-West Trade, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 
(2006) (differentiating countries ineligible for normal trade relations from 
countries not covered in Column 1 of the Tariff Schedules).  
81 The Jackson-Vanik amendment was enacted into law as part of Title IV of 
the 1974 Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2056, signed into law on Jan. 3, 
1975 by President Gerald Ford.  See Thomas J. Probert, The Innovation of the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A HISTORY 323 
(Brendan Simms & D.J.B. Trim eds., 2011) (attributing the raison d’etre of the 
Jackson-Vanik amendment to a desire to promote ease of emigration for Jews in 
the USSR).  
82 See generally 19 U.S.C. § 2432, supra note 80. 
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amendment was directed at the Soviet Union, it was drafted in 
general language that did not limit its application to any particular 
country.83  The United States began to apply the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment to China, requiring an annual certification of 
compliance or a presidential waiver in order for China to receive 
MFN status, i.e. access to the GATT tariff rates in Column 1 of the 
HTSUS.84  The stakes were high for China because the imposition 
of the much higher Column 2 Smoot Hawley tariff rates would 
have a serious negative impact on China’s ability to export goods 
to the United States.  In addition, if China did not receive MFN 
treatment for its imports, the United States would have no 
obligation to permit entry of the goods at all.85  In other words, 
China’s lack of MFN treatment would have allowed the United 
States to impose a quota in the form of a total or partial ban on 
Chinese imports.  The United States would not be subject to any 
disciplinary measures under the GATT or the WTO for imposing 
the draconian Column 2 Smoot Hawley tariffs or a ban on imports 
with respect to China because China was not a GATT contracting 
state or a member of the WTO.86  Because China was outside of the 
                                                     
83 See Kuo, supra note 77, at 104 (explaining that Jackson-Vanik amendment 
provisions applied to all nations not receiving MFN treatment from the United 
States, and that although this was mainly directed towards the USSR at the 
inception of the amendment, its applicability to China was within its legislative 
bounds). 
84 See id. at 101-03 (summarizing the Trade Act of 1974 and describing the 
process by which a country may conditionally qualify for MFN status). 
85 GATT Article XI contains a general prohibition of quantitative restrictions 
or quotas.  Since China was not a member of the GATT or WTO until 2001, China 
had no right to the benefits of Article XI as a matter of GATT or WTO law.  If the 
United States imposed a quota on imports from China, the matter would be a 
bilateral political and economic issue between the United States and China 
outside of the GATT or WTO framework because China was not a member of 
either treaty.  If China were able to obtain MFN treatment from the United States, 
however, China would be entitled to the benefit of Article XI since under MFN, 
the United States would have to extend the same benefits to China that it extends 
to all other GATT countries, which includes the benefit of the no-quotas rule of 
GATT Article XI.  
86 The WTO has a dispute settlement mechanism that replaces the procedures 
under the GATT.  See CHOW AND SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra 
note 11, at 63-64.  The WTO can authorize the aggrieved party to undertake 
retaliation in the form of countermeasures, which can be in the form of increased 
tariffs on imports from the offending country.  See id. at 68.  To use the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism, however, a nation must be a member of the WTO. 
See id. at 63 (“[W]hen a state becomes a member of the WTO, it automatically 
submits to the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system. The WTO also 
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GATT and WTO, these economic issues were purely bilateral trade 
and thus the two countries were free to come to their own 
arrangements independent of the multilateral trade treaties. 
Though the Jackson-Vanik amendment was intended to review 
emigration policies, the amendment when applied to China took 
the form of an annual general review of China’s human rights 
policies in which the President would issue a waiver after a 
congressional review and “approval” of China’s human rights 
record.87  China’s annual Jackson-Vanik amendment review hence 
became a ritual in which the United States would criticize China’s 
human rights record, give lectures to China on its many 
deficiencies, and make threats, but ultimately would agree to 
extend MFN treatment to China for another year.88  In return, 
China would endure the humiliation of the annual ritual in stoic 
silence and make a few symbolic humanitarian gestures during the 
period of review, such as releasing high profile political dissidents 
from imprisonment.89  But China never implemented any major 
reforms in human rights as a result of these reviews90 (nor has 
China ever forgotten the humiliation of its annual “review”).91  
                                                     
carries automatic penalties that apply if the WTO member does not comply with a 
final ruling under the WTO dispute settlement system.”). 
87 See Kuo, supra note 77, at 110 (discussing how the process of extending 
MFN status to China under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment allowed Congress to 
pass a resolution of disapproval, which it used “as a ‘dumping ground’ for its 
grievances against China”). 
88 See Alan S. Alexandroff, Concluding China’s Accession to the WTO: The U.S. 
Congress and Permanent Most Favored Nation Status for China, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF. 23, 32 (1998) (noting that the initial three-year bilateral trade 
agreement granting China MFN status, which went into effect on February 1, 
1980, has since been extended five times). 
89 See China Releases 3 Prisoners in Gesture to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1994, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/05/world/china-releases-3-prisoners-in-
gesture-to-us.html (reporting a case where China released three political prisoners 
apparently in response to a threat by the United States to withhold favorable trade 
status for China in the following year if its human rights record was not 
improved). 
90 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994 
(1995), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/ 
1994_hrp_report/94hrp_report_eap/China.html (detailing a list of ongoing 
human rights abuses that occurred during 1994, ranging from restriction of 
population mobility and violation of freedom of expression, to the more egregious 
cases of torture, extrajudicial imprisonment, and disappearances).  
91 This observation is based upon the author’s own discussions in China with 
academics and government officials.  Many in China remain sensitive to how the 
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During the 1990s, Congress attempted to introduce specific human 
rights criteria in the annual review, but this proposal was 
rejected.92  In 2001, China formally acceded to the WTO and 
became entitled to MFN treatment under GATT Article I and to the 
United States’ GATT tariff rates in Column 1 of the HTSUS as a 
matter of right under WTO law.93  After 2001, China no longer had 
to suffer through an annual MFN review under the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment and the legislation became irrelevant to China.94 
3.  BENEFITS OF CHINA’S WTO MEMBERSHIP 
China’s membership in the WTO entitles China to full WTO 
rights and benefits (and obligations), which are too numerous to 
discuss in detail here.  For the purposes of this article focusing on 
China’s exports, the most important rights and benefits are set 
forth below. 
3.1. The Right to Lowest GATT Bound Tariffs from any WTO Member 
Under GATT Article I, China is entitled as a matter of right to 
the GATT low tariff rates under the MFN principle for all its 
exports to the United States and to all other WTO members.95  The 
                                                     
United States used the Jackson-Vanik annual review.  Common perception at the 
time was that the annual review was used by the U.S. government as an 
opportunity “to criticize Beijing’s violation of human rights” and to “bash” China. 
See James A. Dorn, Time to Repeal the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, CATO INSTITUTE, 
JAN. 14, 1999, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-repeal-
jacksonvanik-amendment. 
92  See VLADIMIR N. PREGELJ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30225, MOST-FAVORED-
NATION STATUS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 4 (2001) (describing an attempt 
that was made to condition China’s MFN annual renewal on “China’s adherence 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, release of and accounting for 
Chinese citizens imprisoned . . . for the nonviolent expression of political and 
religious beliefs, ensuring humane treatment of prisoners by allowing access to 
[Chinese] prisons by . . . human rights organizations,” though, in the end, all of 
these conditions were rejected by the U.S. Congress). 
93  See generally, Accession of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 76 
(serving as the formal instrument that entitles China to accession to the WTO and 
detailing obligations and rights China assumes as a result of the accession).  
94  See generally DAVE CAMP, RUSSIA & MOLDOVA JACKSON-VANIK REPEAL ACT 
OF 2012, H.R. REP. NO. 112-632 (2012) (abolishing the Jackson-Vanik amendment 
which appeared to have lost all relevance after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and upon China’s accession to the WTO).  The bill was passed on 
November 16, 2012.  
95  GATT, supra note 30 (providing the relevant section of Article 1: General 
Most-Favoured Nation Treatment:  “With respect to customs duties and charges 
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MFN principle means that China is entitled to the lowest tariffs 
granted by any WTO country to any other WTO country.96  For 
example, if the United States grants a low tariff on a product 
imported from any WTO country in the absence of a special 
bilateral free trade pact,97 then the United States is required under 
the MFN principle to grant the same low tariff on like products 
imported from China, immediately and unconditionally. 
Under GATT Article II, the United States cannot unilaterally 
raise its tariffs or impose additional tariffs on top of the GATT 
rates.98  For example, if the United States unilaterally and suddenly 
raised its tariffs on imports of textiles from China above its GATT 
rate by any amount, the United States would be in violation of 
GATT Article I and GATT Article II, and would be required by the 
                                                     
of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or 
imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and 
with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to 
all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with 
respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,* any 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any 
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for 
the territories of all other contracting parties). 
96 See id. at art. III (requiring that, with few exceptions, member nations 
reflect equal treatment in their internal taxation and regulation schemes with 
respect to fellow member nations).  See also CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 130 (providing an example of how GATT Article 1: 
General Most-Favoured Nation Treatment functions). 
97 See id at art. XXIV (creating an exception for free trade agreements, which 
are permitted to create preferences that do not need to be extended under MFN to 
all WTO members).  For example, under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, almost all goods travel duty free between the United States, Mexico, 
and Canada.  Under an exception to MFN contained in Article XXIV, the members 
of NAFTA are not required to extend duty free treatment to goods from other 
WTO members.  
98  See id. at art. II (“Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of 
the other contracting parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for 
in the appropriate Part of the appropriate schedule annexed to this Agreement.”).  
The effect of GATT Article II 1(a) is to “bind” all tariffs and to treat all 
commitments in each country’s GATT schedule as a ceiling for tariffs.  The United 
States could not therefore impose a tariff rate that is higher than the GATT rate set 
forth in its schedule on an import from China without violating GATT Article II 
1(a).  See also id. at art. XXVIII (providing a procedure for changing agreed upon 
GATT tariff rates, but it is time consuming and requires consultations with other 
WTO members).  
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WTO to withdraw the tariff increase.99  Under some circumstances, 
however, if China engages in certain defined unfair trade practices, 
the United States would be entitled to impose additional tariffs as 
an authorized trade remedy.100  A later section of this Article 101 
will set forth the unfair practice that justify trade restrictions in 
detail and the remedies that are available. 
3.2. The “No-Quotas” Rule 
China enjoys a second WTO trade right that directly benefits its 
export trade.  Under GATT Article XI,102 WTO members are 
generally prohibited from imposing quantitative restrictions or 
quotas on imports from China.  For example, suppose that the 
United States imposes a quota that no more than one million 
laptop computers can be imported from China in any single year. 
Prior to China’s entry to the WTO in 2001, nothing would prevent 
the United States from imposing such a quota and the issue would 
be a diplomatic economic and trade issue between China and the 
United States.  After China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, 
however, the quota is prohibited under GATT Article XI unless 
certain exceptions defined under Article XX of the GATT are 
present, and the United States can carry the burden of justifying 
                                                     
99 Under the WTO dispute settlement system, when the WTO panel, which 
functions like a trial court, or the appellate body, which functions like an appeals 
court, finds a WTO violation, the body will “recommend” that the offending WTO 
member bring the non-conforming measure into conformity.  See CHOW & 
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 64.  The WTO goes to 
great lengths to avoid litigious and adversarial sounding language, reflecting its 
diplomatic roots.  In general, WTO members almost always abide by decisions of 
the WTO dispute settlement body due to peer pressure, political necessity, and 
the desire for the WTO to be able to continue to function effectively.  The WTO 
dispute settlement system is considered to be one of the WTO’s outstanding 
successes.  See id. at 63. 
100 See infra Part 5.2. 
101 See infra Part 5.1. 
102 GATT Article XI: General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions 
provides the following, in part: 
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, 
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other 
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on 
the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting 
party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for 
the territory of any other contracting party. 
GATT, supra note 30, at art. XI.  
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the quota under GATT Article XX, the exceptions provision.103 
Otherwise, the United States would be required by the WTO to 
withdraw the quota.104  Part 5 of this Article will set out these 
exceptions under GATT Article XX in detail and discuss how they 
are interpreted by the WTO.105 
The benefits of the WTO discussed above mean that China’s 
exports to the United States are protected as follows:  first, China’s 
exports are entitled to the lowest GATT rates that the United States 
gives to any other country under the MFN principle contained in 
GATT Article I;106 second, the United States cannot unilaterally 
increase these rates or impose extra tariffs without a justification 
from the United States that China has engaged in certain 
prohibited forms of unfair trade practices;107 and,  third, China’s 
exports to the United States cannot be subject to quantitative 
restrictions – quotas – without some trade justification, cognizable 
under the WTO, from the United States.108  These rules – access to 
the most favorable or lowest GATT tariff rates and the general “no-
quota” rule – provide access for Chinese imports to the U.S. market 
and allow China to fully pursue its aggressive mercantilist strategy 
of domestic growth based upon exports to the United States, the 
European Union, and other WTO countries around the world.109  
Both of these benefits, so important to support China’s mercantilist 
strategy, were available to China for the United States only after 
enduring an embarrassing and humiliating annual review by the 
United States prior to China’s entry into the WTO.110  Today, these 
benefits are available to China as a matter of WTO law. 
                                                     
103 GATT Article XIX allows a temporary ban on imports when there is a 
sudden surge of imports that might harm unsuspecting domestic industries. 
These measures, called “safeguards,” are allowed only under certain conditions 
and are temporary in nature.  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW, supra note 11, at 373. 
104 See supra text accompanying note 101 (listing Art. XI’s prohibition on 
quotas).  
105 Infra Part 5.1. 
106 Supra text accompanying note 98. 
107 See id. 
108 Supra text accompanying note 103. 
109 See supra Part 2.1 (detailing the history of China and its membership, and 
lack of membership, in GATT). 
110 See supra Part 2.2 (detailing the circumstances surrounding China’s 
asssession in the WTO). 
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4. NEUTRALIZING CHINA’S COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN GOODS 
 China’s entry into the WTO with the attendant access to the 
trade protections and benefits of the WTO, along with its 
aggressive mercantilist strategies, has resulted in a spectacular 
growth of China’s export trade to the United States and other 
countries in the world.111  The growth of China’s export trade, 
however, has some negative repercussions for the United States as 
further discussed below. 
4.1. The U.S. Trade Deficit with China 
In 1985, when China was preparing to enter into negotiations 
for accession to the WTO, the United States had a trade deficit of 
zero for the trade in goods with China.112  By 2011, the trade deficit 
had mushroomed to approximately $295.5 billion.113  That same 
year, total imports from China to the United States were $393.3 
billion,114 whereas U.S. exports to China were only $103.9 billion,115 
so China is earning net revenues of nearly $300 billion a year in its 
trade with the United States.  Negative perceptions of China’s 
trade practices are also fueled by a widespread belief among U.S. 
politicians and the public that China cheats in trade through the 
use of various unfair or illegal tactics.116  The worrisome concern 
                                                     
111 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 48, at 28, 36 
(supplying figures and analysis of China’s recent expansive trade growth, 
especially with the United States).    
112 WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33536, CHINA-U.S. TRADE 
ISSUES 1, 3 (2012). 
113 Id. 
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
116 See Aaron Back, China Stands Firm Against U.S. on Trade, WALL ST. J. 
(March 14, 2012, 7:00 AM) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405 
2702303863404577280894205257130.html (describing how both U.S. presidential 
candidates in 2012 responded to the “[c]riticism of Chinese trade practices . . . 
heating up in the U.S.” by taking strong positions against China’s trade practices); 
Senator Bob Casey, For American Jobs, China’s Cheating on Rare Earth Trade Must 
End, THE HILL’S CONGRESS BLOG (Mar. 23, 2012, 1:29 PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/217845-for-american-
jobs-chinas-cheating-on-rare-earth-trade-must-end (stating that the WTO found 
China to have broken many commitments and that the “United States must stop 
China’s cheating”); Bob Davis & Tom Orlik, Bucking Trend, U.S.-China Trade Gap 
Grows, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2012, 7:50 PM), http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052702303292204577516673966206002.html (explaining that 
U.S. politicians and the public perceive that China cheats in trade by using 
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over the deficit, further deepened by a widespread belief that 
China cheats, has led the U.S. government to launch an all-out 
assault on imports from China using whatever trade remedies are 
available to stem the influx of Chinese goods and to decrease the 
trade deficit or at least to slow down its continuing growth.117 
4.2.  Neutralizing China’s Comparative Advantages Through Trade 
Remedies 
Although experts dispute the causes of the U.S. trade deficit 
with China, one major factor is the low cost of labor in 
manufacturing in China.118  The average hourly wage of a factory 
worker in China is $1.36 per hour while the average hourly wage 
for a factory worker in the United States is $23.32.119  These 
statistics indicate that the hourly wage of a factory worker in the 
United States is seventeen times that of a worker in China; 
moreover, China has other immense trade advantages including a 
massive supply of driven, capable workers willing to work long 
hours under precarious conditions and willing to do tedious, 
repetitive factory manufacturing work at a fraction of the cost of a 
U.S. counterpart.120  Such a cost advantage for Chinese workers 
                                                     
various unfair or illegal tactics); Peter Navarro, U.S. Trade Policy: America’s 
Unequal Trade Relationship With China, L.A. TIMES, June, 21, 2011, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/21/opinion/la-oe-navarro-trade-china-
20110621 (insinuating that China “cheats” and directly writes “China uses unfair 
trade practices to way war on [the U.S.] manufacturing base”).  
117 See infra Part 5.2 (analyzing, in depth, methods to equalize or decrease 
China’s trade advantages, including additional tariffs for human rights 
violations). 
118 See Michele Nash-Hoff, U.S.-China Trade Deficit Cost More Than 2.1 Million 
Manufacturing Jobs, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Sep. 6, 2012, 12:03 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michele-nashhoff/uschina-trade-deficit-
cos_b_1855285.html (identifying the lower manufacturing wages of Chinese 
workers, a result of the extensive suppression of labor rights, as a contributing 
factor to the U.S.-China trade deficit). 
119 See Bonnie Kavoussi, Average Cost Of A Factory Worker In The U.S., China 
And Germany, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar 8, 2012, 3:36 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/08/average-cost-factory-
worker_n_1327413.html (blaming, in part, the loss of almost three million U.S. 
manufacturing jobs on the lower average hourly wages of Chinese factory 
workers). 
120 Admittedly, this labor supply trend may be declining, though it is not 
certain when the economic effects will be felt.  See Yukon Huang & Clare Lynch, 
Where Have China’s Workers Gone?, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2013, 6:55 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-06/where-have-china-s-workers-
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seems to be impossible to overcome in the United States by making 
adjustments in the U.S. workplace.  But what if the United States 
was able to demonstrate that China cheats in creating such low 
costs and then was able to use trade laws to neutralize these 
advantages enjoyed by China?  Suppose that the United States 
could impose a permanent ban on imports from China in certain 
areas, such as textiles (e.g. clothing and footwear) or impose a 
quota – an upper limit – on the amount of imports from China in 
industries where U.S. industries are struggling to compete?  In 
addition, what if the United States could impose an extra tariff on 
Chinese imports that could offset the cost advantages in labor 
enjoyed by China?  Suppose that the United States could impose an 
additional tariff equivalent to the difference in the labor costs 
between China and the United States of producing a good that 
would then have the result of equalizing the labor costs in China 
and the United States.  If it is able to do so, the United States will 
have removed what is commonly viewed as China’s greatest 
competitive advantage over the United States and U.S. goods 
would become immediately more competitive.121  The “playing 
field” would be leveled, according to the proponents of this view, 
and over time, fewer Chinese goods will be imported and the trade 
deficit will begin to decline.122 
The availability of these remedies – extra tariffs in the form of 
countervailing duties to offset China’s labor cost advantages and 
import bans in industries where the United States is particularly 
vulnerable – lie at the heart of the debate over the use of human 
rights in the WTO. 
From China’s perspective, a view shared by many developing 
countries, low manufacturing costs are a legitimate comparative 
advantage that should not be eroded by trade remedies.  China 
views itself at a different stage of economic development than the 
                                                     
gone-.html (“China’s large pool of surplus labor has fueled its rapid industrial 
growth. Now this ‘demographic dividend’ may be almost exhausted.”).  The 
International Monetary Fund suggests the effects of such a shortage, however, 
will not be felt until between 2020 and 2025, while another view holds that 
“China’s surplus labor is still plentiful, given that about 40 percent of the labor 
force is still underutilized in the rural sector, mostly in agriculture, which 
accounts for only 10 percent of gross domestic product.”  Id.  
121 See infra Part 5.2 (providing further analysis about potential options 
available to the United States to decrease China’s trade advantage). 
122 Infra Part 5.2. 
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United States.  Although China’s economy is now the second 
largest in the world, China is still firmly in the ranks of low income 
countries and except for a small class of elites, China remains a 
poor country overall, with large rural areas that are extremely 
poor.123  The standard of living in China for the vast bulk of its 
population cannot realistically be compared to that of the United 
States.124  China and other developing countries believe that it is 
not realistic or fair to expect them to implement labor conditions 
similar to those of countries at a far more advanced stage of 
development.125  China (and other developing countries) also find 
arguments linking human rights to trade in the WTO to be 
hypocritical on the part of developed countries.126  These 
                                                     
123 CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 48, at 20. 
124 See id. (comparing income and other living standard statistics from China, 
“the first developing country to become a global economic power,” to other 
leading world powers). 
125 H.E. Vice Minister Long Yongtu, who is Head of the Chine Delegation of 
the WTO, stated: 
As we have emphasized consistently at various occasions in the past, 
although great progress has been made on China’s economic 
development in the past two decades, we still firmly believe that China is 
a developing country. The position we have taken to accede to the WTO 
as a developing country is not only a reflection of the actual economic 
level of China at the present stage, but also our political choice. 
Long Yongtu, Vice Minister and Head of the Chinese Delegation, Meeting of the 
Working Party on the accession of China to the World Trade Organization, 
WORLD TRADE ORG. (July 4, 2001), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news01 
_e/china_longstat_jul01_e.htm. The question of China’s status as developing or 
developed for purposes of trade commitments remains.  See Joost Pauwelyn, The 
End of Differential Treatment for Developing Countries? Lessons from the Trade and 
Climate Change Regimes, 22 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 29, 31-32 (2013) 
(“Under some WTO agreements . . . China explicitly agreed to forego certain 
phase-in periods normally granted to developing countries. . . . China considers 
itself to be a developing country, whereas other WTO members . . . have contested 
that China automatically benefits from all developing country provisions . . . .”). 
126 Professors Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner observe: 
The United States and other Western democracies have long predicted 
that China’s receptiveness to economic globalization and liberal market 
institutions would spur political change in China. Yet the link between 
economic liberalization and democratization in China has proved to be 
elusive.  China has enjoyed economic benefits from liberal international 
institutions while resisting any political liberalization that was expected 
to follow from its increasing international engagement.  The Chinese 
government has also nurtured a sentiment among its citizenry that 
Western-style democracy would be unsuitable for China’s current 
economic conditions. According to the government, embracing civil and 
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arguments are viewed by China and other developing countries as 
thinly veiled excuses for eroding their trade advantages created by 
low cost manufacturing.127  These considerations suggest that 
China will strongly oppose any attempts to include human rights 
at the workplace rights in the WTO. 
From the United States’ perspective, China has cheated in 
creating low cost manufacturing advantages.  The United States 
feels justified in using any means possible to neutralize these 
unfair practices that harm the United States by contributing to an 
increase in its trade deficit with China.128  As the next parts of this 
Article will demonstrate, introducing human rights as a fair trade 
criterion into the WTO would make such new remedies available 
to the United States.  Given the intense U.S. concerns over its trade 
deficit with China, such new weapons could be very appealing to 
the United States.  This is really the crux of the debate over 
whether to include human rights in the WTO.  The next sections 
now turn to these issues in detail. 
5. THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE TO CURTAIL 
TRADE FROM CHINA AFTER CHINA’S ENTRY INTO THE WTO 
Part 4 sets forth the major benefits to China when it joined the 
WTO:  legal protection against the unilateral imposition of quotas 
and the imposition of tariffs above the GATT bound rates on 
imports.  As the earlier discussion has indicated, during the period 
prior to China’s entry into the WTO, China’s trade relations with 
the United States were conditioned upon an annual review of 
China’s human rights record.129  During this period, if the United 
States had imposed trade sanctions such as quotas and tariffs on 
                                                     
political rights incorporated in international human rights treaties would 
destabilize Chinese society and endanger its pursuit of economic welfare 
for the benefit of its citizens. 
Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 33–34 (2011)  
127 Id. 
128 See, e.g., William McQuillen, Obama Targets China with Enforcement Group 
Aimed at Unfair Trade Practices, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 24, 2012, 9:36 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-25/obama-vows-to-get-tough-on-
trade-enforcement-help-u-s-companies-compete.html (“’It’s not fair when foreign 
manufacturers have a leg up on ours only because they’re heavily subsidized,’ 
Obama said.”). 
129 See supra Part 2.2.  
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imports as punishment for China’s human rights violations, there 
was no remedy available to China within the multilateral trading 
system; this would have been a bilateral trade and diplomatic issue 
left up to China and the United States to settle on their own and, at 
this time, the United States had the far larger economy and much 
greater economic power.130  How has this situation changed after 
China’s entry into the WTO?  Are there legal avenues under the 
WTO that could potentially allow the United States to impose 
quotas and tariffs above the agreed upon GATT rates on China for 
violations of human rights?  This Part now examines the provisions 
of the WTO that could potentially serve to neutralize the trade 
advantages that China has obtained through its WTO entry. 
5.1. The General Exceptions Provision and the Justification of Trade 
Bans 
When the GATT was adopted in 1947, the drafters believed 
that it was important to include a provision that recognized 
“linkages” between trade and civil society issues.131  This 
provision, GATT Article XX, known as the general exceptions 
provision, recognized that trade could result in harmful effects on 
civil society and thus recognized certain instrumental values that 
would serve as exceptions that would justify restrictions on trade.  
Note carefully that the effect of a measure falling under Article XX 
is that it is a justified restriction on trade;132 the measure can stand 
permanently and the trade restriction does not ever have to be 
removed. 
To understand how introducing human rights into the WTO 
would create new trade weapons for the United States, it is 
necessary to review Article XX and how it operates to justify trade 
restrictions.  GATT Article XX provides: 
                                                     
130 See WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S 
ECONOMIC RISE: HISTORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED 
STATES, (Sept. 5, 2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534. 
pdf; Jack L. Hervey, Foreign Trade and the U.S. Economy, CHICAGO FED LETTER, no. 
91, Mar. 1995, at 1, available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/chicago_fed_letter/199
5/cflmarch1995_91.pdf.  
131 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 
299-300 (discussing the enumerated general exceptions that permit restrictions on 
trade). 
132 See id. 
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Article XX 
General Exceptions 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not 
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; 
(c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or 
silver; 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations 
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, including those relating to customs 
enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated 
under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the 
protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights, and the 
prevention of deceptive practices; 
(e) relating to the products of prison labour; 
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of 
artistic, historic or archaeological value; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption.133 
If a trade restriction falls within any of the categories listed in 
(a)-(f) and also satisfies the requirements of the introductory 
paragraph, called the “chapeau,” then the trade restriction is 
justified under Article XX as an exception to any trading rights set 
                                                     
133 See GATT, supra note 30, at art. XX (listing the exceptions to trade 
restrictions). 
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forth under any of the other provisions in GATT.134  As an example 
of how Article XX works in practice, in the EC-Asbestos case,135 the 
European Communities (EC) imposed a total trade ban on imports 
of asbestos-containing products from Canada.  The EC invoked 
Article XX(b), the exception for measures “necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health.”136  Note that the EC 
imposed a complete trade ban – a quantitative restriction of zero.  
A quota of zero (or a quota of any kind) would normally be in 
violation of GATT Article XI, which sets forth a general prohibition 
of quotas.  However, the EC’s trade ban or quota of zero was 
justified under Article XX(b) because the EC demonstrated that 
allowing the imported asbestos products, which had been 
demonstrated by scientific evidence to cause various respiratory 
diseases, would harm the health and safety of consumers in the 
EC. 
In the Shrimp/Turtle case,137 the WTO Appellate Body upheld a 
total trade ban on imported shrimp based on environmental 
concerns under Article XX(g).138  In that case, the United States had 
                                                     
134 The chapeau “looks like boilerplate that is too general to have any effect,” 
but such a description is untrue.  CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW, supra note 11, at 300.  In fact, the chapeau played a key role in the 
Shrimp/Turtle cases involving environmental protection discussed infra note 137.  
The jurisprudence concerning the interpretation of the chapeau, although 
important, is not central to the argument in this article. 
135 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measure Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) 
(providing an example where the exceptions listed in Article XX of the GATT was 
invoked and justified). 
136 See GATT, supra note 30, at art. XX(b). 
137 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter 
Shrimp/Turtle] (introducing the break through case where environmental concerns 
were accepted as a justifiable excuse for trade restrictions). 
138  Shrimp/Turtle reversed a longstanding attitude of indifference in the WTO 
to environmental concerns.  See id.  In an earlier line of cases, decided during the 
1990s, the GATT reached results that drew intense criticism from environmental 
groups that the GATT was insensitive to environmental concerns.  In 
Tuna/Dolphin I, a 1991 GATT dispute, the United States imposed a ban on imports 
of tuna caught using a method that also killed dolphins.  Panel Report, United 
States–Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (Sep. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th 
Supp.) at 155 (1991).  Mexico challenged the trade ban as in violation of GATT 
Article XI, which, as we have seen earlier, prohibits the use of quotas.  Id.  The 
United States attempted to justify the ban on the basis of Article XX(g) as a 
measure “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”  Id.  The 
GATT panel rejected the argument by the United States on two grounds which 
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imposed a ban on imports of shrimp caught using methods that 
also killed turtles.139  Although the Appellate Body rejected the U.S. 
ban on the facts of the case, the Appellate Body drew a roadmap 
for how the United States could justify a trade ban based on Article 
XX(g).  The Appellate Body in Shrimp/Turtle found that the U.S. 
measures that banned shrimp imports unless they were caught 
using a “Turtle Excluded Device” (TED) could meet the 
requirements of Article XX(g) as “relating to conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources.”140  The turtles qualified as an 
“exhaustible natural resource” and under the facts of the case itself, 
the actual U.S. measures were objectionable because the United 
States had not attempted to negotiate with specific countries, such 
as Thailand, on accepting the measures.141  Instead, the United 
States had attempted to impose the same measures on all countries 
without leaving room to account for differences among 
countries.142  The Appellate Body’s decision, however, pointed the 
way to a successful defense of the measures if the United States 
gave each country an opportunity to negotiate over the measures 
rather than unilaterally imposing the measures.  Using this 
                                                     
enraged environmentalists:  (1) the capture methods were a process, procedure, 
and method (PPMs) that did not affect the product itself – the tuna – and PPMs 
are not within the scope of GATT Article XX, the general exceptions provision; the 
capture methods killed dolphins but did not affect the tuna itself; only capture 
methods that had some direct effect on the physical characteristics of the product 
could be considered to be within GATT Article XX; and (2) the ban imposed by 
the United States had an extraterritorial effect, i.e. the ban was intended to 
influence the conduct of foreign nations and was not limited to affecting conduct 
within the territorial limits of the United States.  Id.  Any trade measure that was 
to be justified under GATT Article XX had to be limited in its territorial effect to 
the nation imposing the measure.  Id.  In Tuna-Dolphin II—decided three years 
later, in 1994—the GATT Panel rejected the U.S. trade ban on even stronger terms.   
Panel Report, United States–Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (Jun. 16, 1994).  
The GATT seemed to foreclose the possibility of using environmental concerns to 
justify a trade restriction and enraged environmentalists.  This is why the 
Shrimp/Turtle case is viewed as a break through and could set a precedent for 
other civil society concerns to be imported into GATT Article XX. 
139 See generally Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 137.  
140 See id. ¶¶ 135–42 (stating the requirement under Article XX(g) that a 
measure sought to be justified be one which "relat[es] to" the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources). 
141 See id. ¶¶ 161–76 (discussing whether U.S. measures were applied in a 
manner that constituted unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail). 
142 See id. 
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procedure, the United States, after unsuccessful negotiations, later 
imposed a total trade ban on shrimp from Malaysia that Malaysia 
then challenged in the WTO.143  The Appellate Body upheld the 
U.S. trade ban on Malaysia.144  The United States was entitled to, in 
effect, impose a total trade ban and use the ban to pressure its 
trading partners to accept environmental standards established by 
the United States. 
The discussion above indicates that the general exceptions 
provision that recognizes linkages between civil society issues and 
trade could potentially be used to justify a trade ban based upon 
non-trade concerns, such as human rights at the workplace, and to 
pressure U.S. trading partners, such as China, to accept U.S. labor 
standards.  The United States could argue that the ban is justified 
under several provisions of the GATT Article XX general 
exceptions provision.  For example, the United States could argue 
that the imports are the result of prison labor (Article XX(e)), labor 
under dangerous work conditions that pose a threat to human 
health and safety (Article XX(b)), or labor under oppressive 
conditions that violate public morals (Article XX(a)).  This Article 
postpones a detailed examination of the viability of these 
arguments under these provisions until Part 6 below,145 but, for 
now, this discussion indicates that potential mechanisms exist 
within the WTO that would allow the United States to neutralize 
one of the major trade benefits that China has obtained through its 
entry into the WTO:  the ‘no-quotas’ rule. 
5.2. Subsidies and Countervailing Duties 
As we have already noted, a second major benefit of China’s 
accession to the WTO is the right to MFN treatment and GATT 
bound tariffs, i.e. China’s imports are entitled to the lowest tariffs 
that are imposed by the United States on any country.146  Are there 
any remedies under the WTO that would allow the United States 
                                                     
143 See Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 148, 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Nov. 21, 2001) (noting that United States had the flexibility to 
consider the particular conditions prevailing in Malaysia if, and when, Malaysia 
applies for certification to export). 
144 See id. 
145 See infra Part 6. 
146 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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to impose additional tariffs, above GATT bound rates, based upon 
human rights violations that would then also neutralize this 
advantage that China has obtained through accession to the WTO?  
Such a remedy does potentially exist in the form of a 
countervailing duty, an extra tariff that can be imposed on top of 
an existing GATT tariff if certain conditions indicating unfair trade 
exist.  This remedy could neutralize China’s other great advantage 
in international trade under the WTO:  access to GATT tariff rates 
for goods that are produced as a result of low cost manufacturing, 
which gives these goods a comparative price advantage. 
5.2.1. WTO Law Relating to Subsidies 
GATT Article VI147 and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement or SCM)148 allow a 
country to impose a countervailing duty (i.e. an additional tariff) to 
offset the effect of a subsidy granted by a foreign government to 
exports.149  A subsidy is a financial contribution made by a 
government to a domestic industry.150  The payment of a financial 
contribution by a government to a domestic producer can give the 
producer a competitive price advantage in manufacturing products 
for export.151  The advantage is derived not by efficiencies of the 
producer but through a payment by the government.  The 
subsidized products are then exported to an importing nation.  The 
subsidized exports will enjoy a competitive price advantage that 
                                                     
147 See GATT, supra note 30, at art. VI (contains the original provision 
authorizing the use of countervailing duties to offset subsidies.  When the WTO 
was established in 1995, the parties believed that it was necessary to elaborate on 
GATT Article XVI and enacted the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures.).  
148 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
The Legal Text - Results of the Uruguay Round 164 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 164 
[herein after SCM]. 
149 See GATT, supra note 30, at art. VI: 3 (discussing countervailing duties). 
150 See SCM, supra note 148, at art. 1.1 (defining a subsidy to include a 
“government practice [that] involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, 
and equity infusion), potential transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan 
guarantees)”). 
151 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 
494-95 (“Due to the cost advantage that [a] subsidy provides, a foreign company 
might be able to export its goods at artificially low prices to [an] importing 
country.”).  
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may then harm the domestic industries of the importing nation.152  
Under the SCM, the importing nation is entitled to challenge the 
practices of providing subsidies directly in the WTO153 or to 
impose a countervailing duty to offset the effect of the subsidy,154 
i.e. if the foreign government provides a payment of fifteen dollars 
for each export, the importing government is allowed to impose a 
countervailing duty of fifteen dollars.155  The imposition of the 
fifteen dollar countervailing duty will offset the benefit of the 
fifteen dollar government subsidy; the net effect of the 
countervailing duty is to increase the price of the import to 
consumers in the importing country and will have an overall effect 
of reducing demand and, as a result, the volume of imports will 
decline.156 
                                                     
152 See id. 
153 See SCM, supra note 148, at art. 4 (remedies to prohibited subsidies). 
154 See GATT, supra note 30, at art. VI: 3 (discussing countervailing duties).  
When subsidized products are being imported into the United States, the United 
States has the option of either imposing a countervailing duty (the unilateral 
remedy) under GATT Article VI: 3 or challenging the subsidization within the 
WTO itself (the multilateral remedy) under SCM Article 4.  The option of 
pursuing either the unilateral remedy or the multilateral remedy is possible only 
when the subsidized product is imported into the country imposing the duty.  For 
example, if China is providing a government subsidy to products that are 
imported into the United States, the United States can impose a countervailing 
duty to offset the effects of the subsidy or can forgo the countervailing duty and 
challenge the act of subsidization directly within the WTO.  But now suppose that 
China is providing a subsidy to a product that is not being exported to the United 
States but to a third country, such as Japan.  In this case, the United States cannot 
impose a countervailing duty as there are no imports from China on which such 
duties can be imposed.  Note that U.S. producers might still be harmed in this 
scenario.  If U.S. producers also export to Japan, then U.S. exports might be 
harmed by the subsidized exports from China in the Japanese market.  In this 
scenario, the United States could have to challenge the subsidization within the 
WTO but cannot use the unilateral remedy of imposing countervailing duties.  
155 See id. (limiting amount of countervailing duties to amount of determined 
foreign subsidy). 
156 Using the unilateral remedy of imposing a countervailing duty does not 
result directly in the removal of the subsidy but does result in additional revenue 
to the importing country and a reduction in demand for the goods.  This decline 
in demand might induce the country providing the subsidy to withdraw it.  Using 
the multilateral remedy, i.e. challenging the subsidization in the WTO, would, if 
successful, result in a withdrawal of the subsidy. 
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5.2.2. Low Cost Labor and Unsafe Work Conditions as Subsidies 
Before a countervailing duty can be imposed under WTO and 
U.S. law, the United States must first demonstrate that a contested 
measure or practice qualifies as a subsidy.  To qualify, the measure 
must meet three requirements:  the measure must (1) be a financial 
contribution or income support by a government;157 (2) confer a 
benefit, not available on the market;158 and (3) be “specific.”159  A 
financial contribution does not have to be a payment but can be the 
result of the non-enforcement of a law that results in a financial 
benefit to the domestic company.160  Although China has extensive 
labor laws designed to protect workers, these laws are often 
ignored by employers and not enforced by government officials.  
For instance, China has laws that limit the workweek to no more 
than eight hours a day and forty-four hours a week on average.161  
Yet, workers routinely work sixty to eighty hours a week in many 
export-oriented factories with yearly hours worked per employee 
as high as 4,000 hours in some enterprises.162  Although the extra 
hours during the workday and the sixth day of work should 
qualify for a higher wage per hour as overtime, no extra wages 
beyond the regular wage are normally provided.163  Employers tell 
                                                     
157 See SCM, supra note 148, at art. 1.1(a)(1)-(2). 
158 Id. at art. 1.1(b). 
159 Id. at art. 2. 
160 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales 
Corporations, ¶¶ 90-101, WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000) (adopted Mar. 20, 2000) 
(holding that that there is a "financial contribution" by a government pursuant to 
SCM to Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) where government revenue that is otherwise due is 
foregone or not collected). 
161 See Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China (Revised) 
(中华人民共和国劳动合同法) (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Jul. 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), art. 36 (providing an 
example where the non-enforcement of the laws result in a benefit to domestic 
companies). 
162 See Judith Banister, Manufacturing Compensation in China: Manufacturing 
Earnings and Compensation, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, Aug. 2005, at 22, 28, available 
at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2005/08/art3full.pdf (estimating the labor 
compensation of manufacturing employees in China in 2002). 
163 See Chen Xin, Survey: Many Bosses Don’t Pay Holiday Overtime, CHINA 
DAILY (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-
10/16/content_15820789.htm  (“The survey, conducted by micro-blogging 
platform Sina Weibo, polled 9,224 netizens, and found 73 percent of respondents 
claimed they worked from Sept 30 to Oct 7 but did not receive overtime pay.”).  
October 1 is celebrated as National Day in China because Mao Zedong declared 
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employees ahead of time of these conditions, and many employees 
gladly accept these conditions due to China’s intensely competitive 
marketplace.164  In addition, although employers are required to 
provide a safe working environment, many workers toil under 
dangerous conditions that often result in injuries and fatalities.165  
It was common until recently for companies to keep a fund to 
compensate relatives of employees who suffered fatalities at 
work.166  Illegal discrimination in the workplace, particularly 
against women, continues to go on with impunity.167  The United 
States could argue that the non-enforcement of labor laws by PRC 
authorities confers a financial benefit to the employer that is not 
otherwise available.  In the market, assuming enforcement of labor 
laws, workers would be paid more in the form of overtime wages, 
the workplace conditions would be safer, and the work 
environment less hostile.  Not having to pay employees overtime 
wages, to provide safe working conditions, and to provide a 
positive workplace environment result in lower costs to the 
Chinese employer, which constitutes a financial benefit. 
The subsidy must also be “specific” in the sense that it cannot 
be generally available.168  For example, the PRC government 
provides paved public roads and highways used by companies to 
transport goods to ports where the goods are then exported.  If the 
PRC government did not provide paved roads, then the companies 
would have to expend their own funds to create useable highways 
or might have to spend extra funds to purchase special vehicles 
                                                     
the founding of The People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949.  The entire 
first week of October is usually celebrated as a holiday in China.  Anyone working 
during the week should receive overtime pay. 
164 This observation is based upon the author’s own field research in China. 
165 See Foxconn Factory Explosion in China Kills Three, BBC NEWS (May 20, 2011, 
2:02 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13476800 (describing an 
explosion at an iPad production factory in China which injured three). 
166 This observation is based upon the author’s own knowledge and 
experience living and working in China as in-house counsel for a multinational 
company. 
167 See Christine M. Bulger, Fighting Gender Discrimination in the Chinese 
Workplace, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 345 (2000), available at http:// 
lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1174&context=twlj 
(describing the ineffectiveness of many of China’s laws that are meant to afford 
women equal employment opportunity).  
168  See SCM, supra note 148, at art. 2 (issuing the criteria for determining 
whether or not a subsidy is specific). 
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capable of moving goods using unpaved goods.  But paved public 
roads are not considered to be a subsidy since they are generally 
available to the public;169 everyone can use the paved roads and so 
they are considered to be the provision of government services that 
is part of the sovereign function of the government.  The 
‘specificity’ test draws the line between a prohibited subsidy and 
the legitimate exercise of sovereign authority to regulate, tax, and 
provide public services.  Under WTO law, however, subsidies used 
to support exports are considered to be “red light” subsidies and 
are specific per se170 because export subsidies are among those that 
cause the worst trade distortions.171  Since export subsidies are 
deemed to be specific as a matter of law, the United States may be 
able to make the case that lax enforcement of labor laws by the 
PRC government authorities constitutes an illegal subsidy that can 
be offset by the imposition of a countervailing duty. 
5.2.3. The United States and Double Remedies Against Imports from 
China 
The use of countervailing duties against imports from China to 
offset low labor costs seems consistent with the current aggressive 
U.S. stance in trade with China.  On March 30, 2007, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) reversed a longstanding 
policy that countervailing duties do not apply to non-market 
economies (“NMEs”) by imposing countervailing duties on 
imports of high-gloss paper from China.172  The prior policy, which 
was affirmed by the landmark case of Georgetown Steel Corp v. 
                                                     
169 See id. at art. 2.1(a) (providing that “[w]here the granting authority . . . 
explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shall be 
specific”). 
170 See id. at art. 3.1(a) (holding that subsidies that are contingent upon export 
performance are prohibited). 
171 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XVI, § B, 2-3, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/ 
booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_06_e.htm#article16 (describing the 
potential harm of export subsidies and recommending that contracting parties 
should seek to “avoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary products”). 
172 See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CHINA CVD FACT SHEET (2007) (announcing 
its “affirmative preliminary determination in the countervailing duty (CVD or 
anti-subsidy) investigation on imports of coated free sheet paper from China”). 
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United States,173 was based upon the idea that a countervailing 
subsidy provides a benefit to an exporter that is not available in the 
market.  This analysis requires a basic comparison between what 
the government has provided and a market-based benchmark.  
Because there is no market-based benchmark in an NME, such as 
China’s economy, there is no way to make this comparison.  For 
this reason, Commerce refused to apply countervailing duties to 
imports from China and other NMEs.  In 2007, however, 
Commerce reversed this longstanding policy on the grounds that 
China is no longer truly an NME but is a “mixed” economy with 
sophisticated marketing and manufacturing techniques.174  
Although Commerce’s change in position does not single out any 
NME, the greatest impact of the change, of course, is on goods 
from China, and few people would doubt that the real target of the 
change in policy were Chinese imports. 
In 2011, in GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States,175 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that, 
consistent with the holding in Georgetown Steel, Congress had 
amended the U.S. subsidies and countervailing duty laws to 
exclude their applications to NMEs.176  Although Commerce has 
some discretion in applying the countervailing duty laws, 
Commerce has no authority to disregard clear congressional intent 
that the countervailing duty laws do not apply to NMEs.  The court 
of appeals concluded, “We affirm the holding of the [Court of 
International Trade] that countervailing duties cannot be applied 
to goods from NME countries.”177 
                                                     
173 See generally, Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986) (upholding the Department of Commerce’s decision that section 303 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930 does not apply to nonmarket economies). 
174 See CHINA CVD FACT SHEET, supra note 172 (“In this preliminary 
determination, Commerce explains that Georgetown Steel no longer applies to 
China of [sic] because of the vast differences between the characteristics of the 
non-market economies of the 1980s Soviet-bloc countries and China’s economy 
today.”). 
175 See generally, GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 666 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (holding that the Department of Commerce was barred from imposing 
countervailing duties on non-market economy goods). 
176 See id. at 745 (affirming the holding from the lower court). 
177 See id.  The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial 
court to consider several constitutional challenges raised by the importers and 
producers and exporters of tires from China.  On remand, the Court of 
International Trade considered several arguments that the 2012 Countervailing 
Duty Law was unconstitutional, including claims that the law as applied to these 
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In the aftermath of GPX International, on March 13, 2012, 
President Obama signed into law “An Act to Apply the 
Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Tariff of 1930 to Non-
Market Economy Countries, and for Other Purposes.”178  The law 
reversed the decision of GPX International and applied 
countervailing duties to imports from China retroactive to 2006.  
The law also affirms yet another controversial U.S. trade practice:  
applying countervailing duties and anti-dumping duties at the 
same time to the same imports from China.  An anti-dumping duty 
is an extra tariff that is applied to imports that are sold at 
artificially low prices in the import market.179  As in the case of 
subsidies, WTO members believed that it was necessary to expand 
and elaborate upon GATT Article VI and enacted the Agreement 
on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (1994) (hereinafter “Anti-Dumping 
Agreement”)).180  Suppose, for example, that a product is sold in 
China for twenty-five dollars and is sold in the United States for 
ten dollars.  The product is being “dumped” at artificially low 
prices in the United States.181  The dumped products might harm 
competitors in the United States, and then once a market niche is 
created, the exporter might raise prices or lower the quality of the 
exports.182  To offset the harm created by the dumped product, the 
                                                     
importers and exporters violated the Due Process Clause.  The importers and 
exporters argued that the 2012 Countervailing Duty Law changed the law mid-
stream in the course of a pending action against them.  The Court of International 
Trade rejected all of these constitutional arguments.  See generally, GPX Int’l Tire 
Corp. v. United States, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013).  The 
constitutional arguments, even they had been upheld, would not have affected the 
validity of the 2012 CVD Law.  This result would indicate that the law is now 
settled that CVDs can be applied to imports from China.  The Court of 
International Trade further remanded the case to the Commerce Department for 
the consideration of technical issues of CVD law.  See id. at 1327-38. 
178 See generally, An Act to Apply the Countervailing Duties Provisions of the 
Tariff Act of 1930 to Nonmarket Economy Countries, and for Other Purposes, 
Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265 (2012). 
179 See GATT, supra note 30, at art. IV, part 1, art. 2 (authorizing the 
imposition of an anti-dumping duty equal to the margin of dumping to offset or 
prevent dumping).   
180 Id. 
181 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 
443 (“Dumping occurs when a product is sold in the export market at a price that 
is lower than the price at which it is sold in the home market.”). 
182 See id. at 445 (describing the harms dumping causes in the export market). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/2
CHOW_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  2:51 PM 
2013] WHY CHINA OPPOSES HUMAN RIGHTS 101 
importing nation is allowed under WTO law to apply an anti-
dumping duty equal to the margin of dumping to offset its 
harmful effects.183  In the example above, the margin of dumping is 
fifteen dollars (twenty-five to ten dollars) and the United States 
could impose an anti-dumping duty of fifteen dollars to offset the 
margin of dumping.184  The United States has begun to impose 
both countervailing duties and anti-dumping duties at the same 
time and on the same imports from China.185  Subsequently, China 
challenged this practice as the imposition of ‘double remedies’ at 
the WTO.  In United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China,186 the 
Appellate Body held that in assessing both dumping and 
countervailing duties on the same products from China without 
having assessed whether double remedies would result from such 
concurrent duties, was inconsistent with Article 19.3 of the SCM.187 
                                                     
183 See GATT, supra note 30, at art. VI: 2 (“In order to offset or prevent 
dumping, a contracting party may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping 
duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such 
product.”); see also Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("Anti-Dumping Agreement"), pt. 1, art. 1. 
(setting guidelines describing circumstances under which anti-dumping measures 
shall be applied). 
184 The example given in the text is a simplified example of dumping, 
involving one single transaction.  Of course, most dumping cases are complex 
because they involve different costs added into the sales price, many numbers of 
sales, and different models of the same product that require sophisticated 
methodologies for determining the margin of dumping.  See CHOW & 
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 454-56 (describing 
calculations of the margin of dumping).  
185 See Dukgeun Ahn & Jieun Lee, Countervailing Duty Against China: Opening 
a Pandora’s Box in the WTO System? 8-10 (Univ. of Mich. Gerald R. Ford Sch. of 
Pub. Policy, Discussion Paper No. 615, 2011), available at 
http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/Papers601-
625/r615.pdf (describing changes in the Department of Commerce’s policy of 
CVD laws as they relate to Chinese trade).  
186 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, ¶¶ 205-206, 
WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 25, 2011) (finding that the U.S. Department of Commerce 
acted inconsistently with SCM Article 19.3 by declining to address China’s 
concern that imposing both anti-dumping and countervailing duties on the same 
products could constitute a double remedy). 
187 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 19.3, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 164  (“[An imposed] countervailing duty shall be levied . . . 
on a non-discriminatory basis on imports . . . found to be subsidized and causing 
injury, except as to imports . . . which have renounced any subsidies in question 
or from which undertakings under . . . this Agreement.”).  
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In response, the March 13, 2012 Public Law 112-99 signed by 
President Obama states that when Commerce applies both 
countervailing duties and anti-dumping duties to a particular case, 
and if Commerce can reasonably detect any double counting, then 
Commerce should reduce the duties to the extent that would 
compensate for the double counting.188  In other words, the United 
States still intends to impose both anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties on the same goods and at the same time, but 
will take into account the WTO’s concern by eliminating double 
counting, in cases where it is possible. 
5.2.4. Likelihood of Use of Countervailing Duties for Labor 
Conditions 
The point of this discussion about double remedies—the 
possibility of imposing antidumping and countervailing duties at 
the same time and on the same goods—is to indicate the current 
hostile mood and aggressive attitude that the United States holds 
towards imports from China.189  It is no exaggeration to say that 
                                                     
188 Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions to Nonmarket Economy 
Countries, Pub. L. No. 112-99, § 2, 126 Stat. 265 (2012).  See also Appellate Body 
Report, United States - Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures On Certain 
Products From China: Request for Consultations by China, WT/DS449/1 (Sept. 20, 
2012), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/cr/ds449-1(cr).pdf.   
189 There is also the possibility of a third remedy—safeguards—that the 
United States might use against China simultaneously with anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties.  Under the WTO, safeguards are temporary measures, such 
as higher tariffs, which can be imposed when there is a sudden influx of imports 
that might cause harm to a domestic industry.  The trade is fair in the sense that 
the surge of imports is not due to some unfair trade practice but to efficiencies so 
that is why the measures are temporary; safeguards are meant to give the 
domestic industry some ‘breathing room’ to adjust to sudden new competition.  In 
the past, the United States has not hesitated to impose safeguards on top of 
existing anti-dumping duties.  In 2002, President Bush imposed safeguards on 
steel imports that were already subject to anti-dumping duties.  Not only were the 
safeguards imposed on top of existing anti-dumping duties, but the safeguards 
were also imposed on virtually all steel products, many of which were from 
China.  Many countries reacted with shock to the scope and severity of the U.S. 
safeguards and immediately raised their own steel tariffs on the expectation that 
steel imports would be diverted from the United States to their markets.  A 
number of countries, including China, also immediately challenged the U.S. 
safeguards in the WTO.  In the Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive 
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248, 249, 251, 252, 
253, 254, 258, 259/AB/R, adopted on December 10, 2003, the WTO rejected many 
of the U.S. safeguards on other grounds, but the WTO did not definitely preclude 
the use of safeguards and anti-dumping duties at the same time.  The use of 
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the United States appears to be using whatever tools and means 
that are available to stem the influx of imports from China and to 
slow down the growth of the trade deficit.190  These efforts are 
further fueled by a pervasive perception by the U.S. government 
and the general populace that China regularly cheats in trade in 
order to encourage exports at the expense of the United States.191  
The combination of these factors suggests that the United States 
would most likely not hesitate to use human rights obligations as a 
means to impose an additional countervailing duty for the low 
labor costs that can be viewed as the result of a subsidy by the PRC 
                                                     
safeguards against China is a special issue because in its Protocol of Accession, the 
agreement governing the conditions of granting China’s accession to the WTO, 
China agreed to permit the United States to single out goods from China for 
safeguards.  See generally, Ministerial Conference Accession of the People’s 
Republic of China: Decision of November 10, 2001, ¶ 16, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 
2001) (stating that there were special safeguard mechanisms to be put into place 
for products of Chinese origin).  Under the Protocol, the United States can impose 
safeguards only against goods from China.  Id.  This practice is inconsistent with 
the WTO’s rules of non-discrimination that would normally require the United 
States to impose safeguards on all like goods from all countries as opposed to 
singling out some countries for safeguards while exempting other countries even 
though they export similar goods to the United States.  In other words, China 
agreed to allow its imports to be singled out by the United States for 
discriminatory treatment in the use of safeguards.  This special safeguard expires 
on Dec. 11, 2013.  See id. (“Application of this Section shall be terminated 12 years 
after the date of accession.”).  
190 See infra Part 5.2.3. The United States’ insistence on pursuing double 
remedies for the same imports – both anti-dumping and countervailing duties – is 
an example of the aggressive U.S. attitude in pursuing trade sanctions against 
China.  There is even the possibility of a third remedy being imposed on goods 
from China, i.e. safeguards, which are also additional tariffs on top of existing 
countervailing and antidumping duties.  See supra note 189 and accompanying 
text.  This creates the possibility of triples remedies being imposed on the same 
imports from China.  In March 2002, President Bush ordered the imposition of 
safeguards on top of existing anti-dumping duties on steel imports from a number 
of countries.  Many countries were genuinely shocked by the severity of the 
double remedies imposed by the United States.  See CHOW AND SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 390.  The possibility of triple 
remedies against imports from China is an indication of just how aggressive the 
United States stance could become in order to stem the influx of Chinese imports. 
191 See Bloomberg View: Smart Trade With China, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Nov. 1, 
2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-11-01/bloomberg-view-
smart-trade-with-china (describing what practices China uses to manipulate trade 
with the United States).  
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government.192  The recent conduct and attitude of the United 
States toward China indicate that the United States will take an 
aggressive approach to seeking trade remedies China.193  The next 
part of this Article assesses the viability of these options.  
6.  THE LEGAL VIABILITY OF IMPOSING A TRADE BAN OR 
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES BASED UPON VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AT THE WORKPLACE 
The discussion in Part 5 of this article describes the potential 
options available to the United States to blunt the two major 
advantages that China’s export trade has obtained through its 
WTO accession.  Prior to China’s WTO accession, as detailed in an 
earlier section, the United States could impose any trade ban or 
any form of higher tariffs without any constraints created by the 
multilateral trading system.194  Such trade ban or any form of 
higher tariffs would be a purely bilateral trade issue between 
China and the United States, and during most of this period the 
United States had the much larger and more powerful economy 
and greater negotiation leverage.  By 2013, China’s economic 
development, fueled by exports, had leapfrogged many other 
countries and placed China now as the second largest economy in 
the world.195  Some experts predict that China will even surpass the 
United States as the world’s largest economy in as short a period as 
twenty years.196  Can the United States stem the explosive growth 
of China by blunting the trade advantages that China obtained as a 
matter of right when it joined the WTO?  Or does China’s accession 
                                                     
192 See supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text (describing certain 
measures the United States has taken to in effect circumvent the low tariff rates 
Chinese exports enjoy as a result of its accession go the WTO).  
193 See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
194 See supra Part 2: Introduction (indicating that prior to China’s accession to 
international trade agreements, the US was able to impose tariffs as it saw fit).  
195 See China Overview, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/ 
country/china/overview (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (“With a population of 1.3 
billion, China recently became the second largest economy and is increasingly 
playing an important and influential role in the global economy.”).  
196 See Chris McGreal, China’s Economy to Outgrow America’s by 2030 as World 
Faces ‘Tectonic Shift’, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2012, 3:38 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/10/chinese-economy-america-
tectonic-shift (“China alone will probably have the largest economy, surpassing 
that of the United States a few years before 2030 . . . .”). 
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to the WTO preclude the United States from using human rights at 
the workplace as a means to place trade restrictions on China? 
To find the answer, we need to look no further than the 1996 
Singapore Ministerial Declaration issued by all members of the 
WTO at the conclusion of the first meeting of all WTO members: 
We renew our commitment to the observance of 
internationally recognized core labor standards.  The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) is the competent 
body to set and deal with these standards, and we affirm 
our support for its work in promoting them. . . .  We reject 
the use of labor standards for protectionist purposes, and 
agree that the comparative advantage of countries, 
particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no 
way be put into question.  In this regard, we note that the 
WTO Secretariat and ILO Secretariats will continue their 
existing collaborations.197 
Although the Singapore Ministerial Declaration may seem to 
promote workers’ rights, a careful examination of this language 
makes clear several basic points.  The most important of these 
points is that workers’ rights are not within the purview of the 
WTO but within the jurisdiction of the ILO.  If workers’ rights are 
not within the recognized scope of the WTO, then worker’s rights 
cannot be brought up within any of the WTO agreements as a basis 
for the justification of a trade restriction.  In other words, it is not 
possible to assert workers’ rights as a justification for a trade ban 
under Article XX of the GATT, the general exceptions provision.198 
Suppose, for example, that a WTO member believed that imposing 
a trade restriction was necessary to protect Chinese workers from 
poor working conditions and that this fell under Article XX(a) as a 
measure “necessary to protect public morals,”199 or under Article 
XX(b) as a measure “necessary to protect human . . . life or 
health.”200  The response to such claims would be that in 
                                                     
197 See Ministerial Conference, Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 
1996, ¶ 4, WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec. 18, 1996) (indicating that labor standards 
should not be used as the basis for trade restrictions). 
198 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (noting that labor standards do 
not form a basis for an exception on trade prohibition bans). 
199 GATT, supra note 30, at art. XX(a). 
200 Id. at art. XX(b). 
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accordance with the Singapore Ministerial Declaration, these 
provisions contained in Article XX cannot be interpreted to include 
factors relating to ‘labor standards’ because these matters are 
outside the scope of the WTO and must be asserted within the ILO.  
Of course, the United States is free to assert these allegations 
against China in the ILO, but the ILO is a toothless organization 
with no enforcement power, so raising such concerns in the ILO 
will not result in any meaningful consequences.201  Moreover, 
because the Singapore Ministerial Declaration states that the ILO is 
the proper organization with which to raise these concerns, it is not 
possible to assert a violation of an ‘obligation’ under the ILO in the 
WTO as the basis of a WTO trade restriction.   
What about GATT Article XX(e) permitting trade restrictions 
“relating to the products of prison labor”?202  Could this exception 
also be extended to other conditions of enslavement, such as child 
labor or labor of workers that have, as a practical matter, no choice 
but to work under oppressive conditions?  The answer, again, 
would appear to be no.   GATT Article XX(e) permitting trade 
restrictions for prison labor was enacted in 1947 as part of the 
original GATT and the concern at the time was with the cheap cost 
of prison labor,203 which was common during this period in world 
history.204  The concern behind the prison labor exception was not 
based upon work conditions in prisons for prisoners.  The 
Singapore Ministerial Declaration on its face refers to “core labour 
standards,” which seems to encompass work conditions and, for 
this reason, both child laborers and workers who toil under 
oppressive conditions without any real choice would fall outside 
the scope of Article XX(e).205  Under the Singapore Ministerial 
                                                     
201 See INT’L ORG. OF EMP’RS, THE EVOLVING DEBATE ON TRADE & LABOUR 
STANDARDS 2 (2006), available at http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo 
_e/posp63_ioe_e.pdf (indicating that linkages between trade and labor standards 
have “proven unworkable”). 
202 GATT, supra note 30, at art. XX(e). 
203 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 
369 (“While GATT Article XX(e) allows for import restrictions on goods produced 
by forced labor, the underlying rationale for this exception is an economic one 
based on the cost advantages created by forced and prison labor.”). 
204 See generally Jackson Taylor Kirklin, Title VII Protections for Inmates: A 
Model Approach for Safeguarding Civil Rights in America’s Prisons, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
1048, 1052–55 (2011) (briefly describing the history of prison labor in the U.S. and 
citing the 1929 Hawes-Cooper Act regulating prison labor). 
205 See Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 197, ¶ 4. 
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Declaration, the appropriate forum in which to assert these 
concerns is the ILO, not the WTO.206 
 Turning now to the issue of countervailing duties imposed on 
China to offset the ‘subsidy’ created by non-enforcement of laws 
leading to lower labor costs, the Singapore Ministerial Declaration 
appears to offer a clear answer to this issue as well.  Poor working 
conditions tolerated by governments are within the purview of the 
ILO, not the WTO, and thus cannot be raised as a justification for 
the imposition of a countervailing duty under the SCM.  In other 
words, work conditions are simply not a factor that can be 
considered in applying the SCM.  The Singapore Ministerial 
Declaration goes further to emphasize that “[w]e reject the use of 
labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the 
comparative advantage of countries, particularly low-wage 
developing countries, must in no way be put into question.”207  
This statement appears to reinforce the rejection of the use of poor 
work conditions as a justification for the imposition of an extra 
tariff in the form of a countervailing duty to offset the cost 
advantage. 
This analysis suggests that the current position of the WTO 
appears to be a significant victory for China and other developing 
countries, which are now protected against the use of human rights 
at the workplace and labor conditions as a justification for the 
imposition of trade sanctions within the WTO by member 
countries, such as the United States.  China gained these benefits as 
a matter of right when it acceded to the WTO.208  Note that there is 
nothing inherent in the language of Article XX, the general 
exceptions provision of the GATT, or in the SCM that would 
prevent the consideration of work conditions as a justification for a 
trade restriction.209  What stands as a legal bar is the Singapore 
Ministerial Declaration itself that declares that human rights at the 
workplace are outside the scope of the WTO.210  What will be 
necessary to overturn the current position?  It would appear that 
                                                     
206 Id.  (indicating that although the WTO and ILO will collaborate, the ILO is 
“the competent body to set and deal with these standards”). 
207 Id. 
208 See supra Part 3 (noting that China gained the ability to be free of these 
restrictions upon joining the WTO). 
209 See GATT, supra note 30, at art. XX; SCM, supra note 148.  
210 See Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 197, ¶ 4. 
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only a document of a similar legal status, such as a second 
Ministerial Declaration, could reverse the current position set forth 
by the Singapore Ministerial Declaration.  This is now the real 
battleground in the WTO:  whether and how to reverse the ban on 
the use of human rights at the workplace set forth in the Singapore 
Ministerial Declaration.  Whether this action will occur in the near 
future is a matter of political will within the WTO but it does not 
appear that such will is present.211   Such a course of development 
is difficult to predict with any confidence, but it is possible to state 
without much doubt that China and many other developing 
countries would strongly oppose any move to introduce human 
rights in the workplace (or in any other context) in the WTO as 
they will perceive such a move as an attempt to erode their 
comparative trade advantages. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The issue of whether to include human rights in the WTO is a 
controversial one with many different sides to the debate.212  Aside 
from all of the obfuscating rhetoric about humanitarian concerns, 
the real issue is whether to make human rights into a criterion of 
fair trade in the WTO that would justify trade restrictions in the 
form of trade bans or higher tariffs.  Between the United States and 
China, the debate, due to reasons of history and current economic 
conditions, has taken on some especially sharp points of 
disagreement, tension, and vitriol.  During the period leading up to 
China’s accession to the WTO, China was made to endure over a 
decade of a humiliating annual lecture and review of its human 
rights record as a condition for renewal of its MFN trading rights 
                                                     
211 As a practical matter, a ministerial declaration would require a consensus 
of all of the trade ministers of each WTO member.  For its entire history, the WTO, 
and its predecessor the GATT, has used a principle of consensus in making 
decisions in the GATT/WTO.  See generally Mary E. Footer, The Role of Consensus 
in GATT/WTO Decision-making, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 653 (1997) (discussing the 
history and role of consensus decision making in the GATT and WTO).  In this 
context, consensus does not mean unanimity, but only that no country objects.  
Under the political culture of the WTO, it would be possible for a small minority 
of WTO countries or even one country to block the adoption of a ministerial 
declaration recognizing human rights as a criterion of fair trade that can be used 
to justify a trade restriction.  Id. 
212 See supra notes 125 & 128 and accompanying text (indicating that 
politicians and others have weighed in with varying viewpoints). 
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under the Jackson-Vanik amendment.213  It is doubtful that China 
has forgotten being placed in the position of a supplicant 
dependent upon the largesse of the United States.  China’s leaders 
are now very sensitive to the perception that they are being bullied 
by the United States (or any other country)214 and show an 
inclination to aggressively assert rights in a manner that is 
commensurate with China’s growing economic and political 
stature in the modern world.215  By joining the WTO, China is now 
protected under the ‘no-quotas’ rule of the GATT and is entitled 
under MFN to the lowest tariffs given by the United States to any 
other nation.216  These two benefits, hard fought gains after 
enduring more than a decade of bullying by the United States 
under the Jackson-Vanik amendment review, are essential to 
protect China’s mercantilist strategy to spur economic growth by 
promoting its export trade to the fullest extent possible.  Whether 
China’s mercantilist strategy is a prudent internal economic policy 
or helpful to global trade is beside the point; China wants the 
ability to pursue it aggressively and to the full extent permitted by 
WTO law.   On the other side, the United States finds itself at the 
short end of an ever widening trade deficit with China with the 
result that China owns more and more of the U.S. economy as 
China is using its export earnings to buy U.S. assets in the form of 
government securities217 and equities.218  While this concern with 
the trade deficit is grave in its own right, the severity of the 
                                                     
213 See supra Part 2.2. 
214 See Thomas J. Christensen, The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding 
to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy, BROOKINGS INST., March/April, 2011, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/03/china-christensen 
(documenting the instances in which sensitivity to a perception of being bullied  
has played out in geopolitical affairs). 
215 See id. (indicating the ways in which China’s leaders have been more 
assertive on the world stage based on an “an exaggerated sense of China's rise in 
global power”).  
216 See supra Part 3: Introduction (noting that China is now entitled to these 
benefits as a result of accession to the WTO). 
217 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 11, at 45-
46, 48 (analyzing policies by China which may prevent the U.S.-China trade 
deficit from naturally correcting itself).  
218 See Chuin-Wei Yap, Smithfield Deal Signals China’s Need for Meat, Dairy, 
Other Food Buys, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424127887324682204578514730858156190.html (documenting the 
growing trend of Chinese firms purchasing U.S. food assets). 
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concern is exacerbated by a widespread perception that China 
cheats in many ways in order to promote its exports, including by 
tolerating illegal work conditions and failing to enforce labor laws 
that create even lower labor and manufacturing costs that make it 
impossible for U.S. producers to compete with China.219 
The concerns of the United States have created a generally 
hostile mood and attitude towards China in the U.S. Congress and 
among many other public and private sectors of the United States.  
The result of this attitude is a search for aggressive trade remedies 
and sanctions that can be used to blunt China’s export trade to the 
United States, a desire made more intense by the perception that 
China is cheating.  This article has examined whether the United 
States can use human rights at the workplace as a tool to justify a 
trade restriction against imports from China.  The conclusions 
reached herein are as follows:  prior to China’s entry into the WTO, 
the United States could have imposed just about any type of trade 
restriction – a total or partial ban (quota), non-GATT tariffs, or a 
combination of these remedies against China without any 
constraints created by the WTO or its predecessor entities.  
However, this situation changed dramatically once China acceded 
to the WTO in 2001.  Under current WTO law, in the view of the 
author, it would not be possible to justify a trade restriction either 
in the form of a trade ban or increased tariffs in the form of 
countervailing duties based upon China’s human rights record at 
the workplace.  It would take a new Ministerial Declaration that 
would repeal the Singapore Ministerial Declaration to change this 
current state of WTO law.220  
 Finally, the debate about whether to include human rights in 
the WTO, although often framed as an issue of human dignity, 
freedom, and respect, is, at least in the debate between the United 
States and China, really an economic debate.  On the one hand, 
labor unions in the United States, if they were being honest, would 
acknowledge that they do not really care about the health, safety, 
and well-being of the average Chinese factory worker who may 
                                                     
219 See China Trade and Jobs, CAMPAIGN FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE, 
http://ourfuture.org/smart_talk/china-trade-and-jobs (last visited Nov. 21, 2013) 
(stating that “’China cheats’ resonates with voters because it is true” and 
describing the various unlawful practices used by China to promote its exports 
and noting that China is guilty of “repeated trade violations”).  
220 See supra Part 6 (analyzing the role of workers’ rights in global trade 
regimes).  
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work under oppressive conditions and in an unsafe workplace 
environment.  To argue otherwise would be flatly disingenuous. 
Their real concern is with the low costs of manufacturing in China 
that create a competitive advantage that appears impossible to 
overcome.   On the other hand, Chinese government officials, if 
they were being honest, would admit that they are not really 
concerned about protecting Chinese sovereignty in resisting 
attempts by the United States to impose western labor standards 
on China.  Their real concern is with keeping labor costs low, by 
any means possible, to sustain China’s cost advantages in its 
exports.  For both countries, the real issue is an economic one of 
whether China (and other developing countries) should be able to 
fully exploit a comparative advantage in low labor costs or 
whether advanced developed countries should be able to 
neutralize such comparative advantages through trade remedies 
such as quotas or increased tariffs.  Framing this issue as an 
economic and trade debate would remove some of the high 
emotions and political posturing that tends to cloud the debate 
when it is framed as one about national sovereignty, human 
dignity, freedom, and respect.  
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